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 Abstract 
We explore the relation between international financial integration and the level of 
entrepreneurial activity in a country. Using a unique data set of approximately 24 million firms 
in nearly 100 countries in 1999 and 2004, we find suggestive evidence that international 
financial integration has been associated with higher levels of entrepreneurial activity. Our 
results are robust to using various proxies for entrepreneurial activity such as entry, size, and 
skewness of the firm-size distribution; controlling for level of economic development, 
regulation, institutional constraints, and other variables that might affect the business 
environment; and using different empirical specifications. We further explore various channels 
through which international financial integration can affect entrepreneurship (a foreign direct 
investment channel and a capital/credit availability channel) and provide consistent evidence to 
support our results. 
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1   Introduction  
In this paper, we explore the relation between a country’s level of international financial integration, 
that is, its links to international capital markets, and the level of entrepreneurial activity. Researchers have 
stressed the roles of entrepreneurship, new firm activity, and economic dynamism in economic growth.1 The 
empirical effects of international capital mobility on firm dynamism and entrepreneurial activity, however, 
have received little attention in the literature albeit the intense academic and policy debates. Using different 
measures commonly employed in the literature in a new data set of more than 24 million firms in nearly 100 
countries in 1999 and 2004, we find higher entrepreneurial activity in more financially integrated countries 
and countries with fewer restrictions on international capital flows.  
The theoretical effects of international financial integration on entrepreneurship are ambiguous.  
The rapid rate of global financial integration, perhaps most directly observed in the explosive growth of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), has raised concerns in both the public and academic communities about 
potential negative effects of international capital on the development of domestic entrepreneurs with 
negative consequences to the economy as a whole. It has been argued that foreign enterprises crowd out 
local efforts, and thus impart few, if any, benefits to the local economy. Grossman (1984) shows, for 
example, that international capital, and in particular FDI, can lead to the crowding out of the domestic 
entrepreneurial class.2 Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argue that laissez-faire and in particular openness can 
lead to too little investment and entrepreneurship ex-ante. Similar concerns were raised by an earlier 
development literature. Hirschman (1958), for example, warned that in the absence of linkages, foreign 
investments can have negative effects on an economy (the so called  ‘enclave economies’). More generally, 
researchers have argued that in the presence of pre-existing distortions and weak institutional settings, 
international capital mobility can increase the likelihood of financial crises; higher volatility and risk can 
reduce entrepreneurship and innovative efforts in a country. Some scholars have asserted that open capital 
markets may be detrimental to economic development (see Bhagwati (1998), Rodrik (1998), and Stiglitz 
                                                 
1 Entrepreneurship and firm creation are often described as the keys to economic growth (Schumpeter 1942). See 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) for an exhaustive survey of Schumpeterian growth models. 
2 In addition, if foreign firms borrow heavily from local banks, instead of bringing scare capital from abroad, they may 
exacerbate domestic firms’ financing constraints by crowding them out of domestic capital markets; see Harrison, 
Love and McMillian (2004) and Harrison and McMillian (2003). 
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(2002)). As Eichengreen (2001) notes, “[C]apital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the 
most controversial and least understood policies of our day.” 
On the other hand, access to foreign resources can enable developing countries with little domestic 
capital to borrow to invest, and resource constrained entrepreneurs to start new firms. Indeed, availability of 
funds has been shown to be an important determinant of entrepreneurship.3 International financial 
integration should also facilitate international risk sharing and thus lower the cost of capital for many 
developing countries, and, by fostering increased competition, improve the domestic financial sector with 
further benefits to entrepreneurship.4 Furthermore, researchers have stressed the potential positive role of 
knowledge spillovers and linkages from foreign firms to domestic firm activity and innovation.5  
Whether international capital mobility is fostering or destroying entrepreneurship is a critical 
question in academic and policy circles.6 Yet, empirical analysis of the effects of international capital 
mobility on entrepreneurial activity and firm dynamism are all but absent from the literature. This is largely 
due to the difficulty of obtaining an international data set sufficiently comprehensive to support studies of 
firm dynamism in both developed and developing countries. We overcome this problem by using a new data 
set of private firms in 98 countries in 1999 and 2004. Our data set contains both listed and unlisted firms 
and contains more than 24 million firm observations across a broad range of developed and developing 
countries at different stages of international financial integration. Over the last decades, barriers to 
international capital mobility have fallen in developed countries and diminished considerably in many 
developing countries. But despite recent trends, restrictions on international financial transactions are still 
quantitatively important for many countries, and de facto flows remain low relative to those predicted by 
                                                 
3 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show theoretically that wealth constraints negatively affect entrepreneurship. Evans and 
Leigthon (1989) find evidence that credit constraints are a critical factor in the founding and survival of new firms.  
4 Increased risk sharing opportunities might encourage entrepreneurs to take on more total investments or attempt new 
ventures; see Obstfeld (1994), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).  
5 Markusen and Venables (1999) propose a model that suggests that FDI will be associated with firm turnover. 
Although entry of foreign firms increases competition and, initially, forces the exit of domestic firms, in the longer run 
multinationals might stimulate local activity through linkages with the rest of the economy. See Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) for a formalization of the linkage effects between foreign and domestic firms. 
6 An example is the on-going debate in the Irish economy about the impact of foreign capital flows, in particular, FDI, 
on local entrepreneurial efforts. Given the limited size of the indigenous sector, one concern has been the potential 
crowding out of domestic entrepreneurship. But some contend that local entrepreneurs have benefited from foreign 
capital, in particular, from interacting with foreign firms as suppliers or costumers or from previous experience 
working in multinational firms. See Alfaro, McIntyre, and Dev (2005) for a discussion. 
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standard models, in particular, for developing countries.7 The coverage of the data enables us to study the 
differential effects of restrictions on capital mobility on entrepreneurial activity. 
Identifying the effects of international financial integration on entrepreneurial activity is, however, 
not an easy task. There is no one definition of entrepreneurship or what it entitles, hence, no one variable to 
measure it.8 Hence, we analyze a variety of measures commonly used in the literature as proxies for various 
aspects of entrepreneurial activity.9 We focus on firm entry, average firm size and skewness of the firm-size 
as these measures better capture firm activity. We also study other measures used in the literature such as 
age and vintage (a size-weighted measure of the average age of the firm). The literature distinguishes 
between de jure indicators of financial integration, which are associated with capital account liberalization 
policies, and de facto indicators, which are associated with actual capital flows.10 We use both, as they 
capture different aspects of international capital mobility and financial integration. We also control for other 
determinants found in the literature to affect the level of entrepreneurship such as local development level, 
market size, and institutional constraints. We use industry fixed effects to control for technological 
determinants of entry, size and activity in an industry.  
We first study the cross-section properties of our sample in 2004. We find positive correlations 
between the different measures of international financial integration and the different measures of 
entrepreneurial activity in a country. More firm activity is observed in more financially integrated countries 
and countries with fewer restrictions to capital mobility. Figure 1 is illustrative of this point. The figure, 
which plots the firm-size distribution for countries with high and low de jure restrictions on foreign capital, 
shows the countries with fewer barriers to international capital to have a higher proportion of small firms.11 
Specifically, in the regression analysis we find more capital controls to be associated with larger firm size 
                                                 
7 See Table 3 for stylized facts, and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2006) for a comprehensive analysis of 
the main trends related to international capital flows in the last thirty years. 
8 Different views in the literature have emphasized a broad range of activities including innovation (Schumpeter, 
1942), the bearing of risk (Knight 1921), and the organization of the factors of production (Say, 1803).  
9 See Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003) Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2005), and Black and Strahan (2002). 
10 See Prasad et al. (2003) for a discussion of the different indices and measures used in the literature. 
11 We divide the firms in our final sample into groups according to de jure restrictions on capital flows (proxied by the 
IMF index). The figure plots the firm-size distribution measured by employment for each group. The skewness values 
for the high and low controls distributions were 562 and 1,446, respectively. The Data Appendix  provides descriptions 
of the variables and a list of countries.    
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and lower skewness of the firm size distribution and firm entry. Firms also tend to be older in less 
financially integrated countries. Our results are both statistically and economically significant.  
As mentioned, our data set allows us to study the determinants of the business environment in a 
broad sample of developed and developing countries. In line with the literature, we find variables related to 
the regulation of entry, for example, days to start a business, to negatively affect entrepreneurial activity; 
while corruption, a proxy for the institutional environment, has a negative and significant effect on the 
dynamism of the economy. In terms of our research question, the relation between international financial 
integration and entrepreneurship remains positive and significant even when we control for these other 
determinants of entrepreneurship. 
Our results are robust to different measures and specifications. We compare our results for 2004 and 
1999 using a difference in differences approach obtaining similar results. In addition, we follow the 
methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2005) and focus on cross-
industry, cross-country interaction effects. Following these authors, we use the Unites States as a proxy of 
the “natural activity” in an industry. We test for whether entry and skewness of the firm size distribution are 
relatively higher or lower in naturally-high-activity industries when the country has relatively high 
international capital mobility. The results confirm our main findings.  
The nature of our data allows us to explore some of the channels through which these benefits might 
materialize. First, international financial integration might increase the total amount of capital in the 
economy and improve the intermediation of capital (a capital/credit availability channel). Although small 
firms might not be able to borrow directly in international markets, improved financial intermediation and 
other firms’ (and the government’s) international borrowing might ease financing constraints until some of 
the additional capital finds its way to new firms. Second, local firms might benefit from spillovers and 
linkages from foreign firms (FDI channel). We test for the former channel by exploring whether 
entrepreneurial activity is higher in firms that are more dependent on external finance as defined by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). The evidence does indeed suggest this to be case. In terms of the FDI channel, our data 
set has the further advantage of enabling us to distinguish between foreign and local firms. We regress our 
entrepreneurship measures on the share of foreign owned firms in the same industry. We also test whether 
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our measures of domestic activity are correlated with the presence of multinational firms in downstream and 
upstream sectors. Given the difficulty of finding input and output matrices for all the countries in our data, 
we follow Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005) in using U.S. input and output matrices (which are 
assumed to describe the technological possibilities of production). Our results are consistent with our 
previous findings. 
Important concerns in our analysis are related to policy endogeneity and omitted variables biases in 
terms of establishing the causality between international financial integration and proxy variables of 
entrepreneurial activity. Capital account liberalization and entrepreneurial activity might, for example, be 
positively correlated with an omitted third factor. If that factor was a government policy –for example, a 
policy-maker anticipating improvements in external conditions liberalizes a country’s capital account– we 
would observe capital liberalization and intensified firm activity. We take different steps to mitigate these 
concerns.  We control for other variables that might affect entrepreneurial activity. We believe the extensive 
robustness analyses we perform eases concerns about potential omitted variables. We also look at different 
proxies for entrepreneurial activity and capital mobility. We analyze firm/industry characteristics as opposed 
to country characteristics, and test effects controlling for the different sectors. Even if firm dynamism is 
correlated because of an omitted common factor, it is hard to argue that the latter affects the relation 
between capital flows and entrepreneurial activity in a systematic way for firms in sectors with different 
characteristics. As an imperfect control for exogenous growth opportunities, we use growth forecast from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). As another imperfect attempt to account for possible endogeneity 
biases, we also use institution-based instruments for financial integration from La Porta et al (1998), which 
have been used in the literature for international financial liberalization and domestic financial 
development.12 This instrumentation strategy yields similar results and confirms that our results are quite 
robust. The results using the difference in differences and the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodologies 
further ease concerns. Finally, we feel more comfortable in interpreting our correlation as causation in as 
much as mechanisms consistent with such an interpretation are supported by the empirical evidence.  
However, even after all of these tests, our estimates should be interpreted with caution.  
                                                 
12  See Imbs (2004), Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003).  
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We noted earlier the scarcity of empirical work on the effects of international capital mobility on 
entrepreneurial activity. A number of papers, however, have studied how different aspects of capital account 
liberalization affect a firm’s financing constraints and the cost of capital. Chari and Herny’s (2004) 
examination of the effect of stock market liberalization in 11 emerging markets suggests that publicly-listed 
firms that become eligible for foreign ownership experience a significant average stock price revaluation 
and significant decline in the average cost of capital. Harrison, Love and McMillian (2004) find FDI inflows 
to be associated with a reduction in firms’ financing constraints while restrictions on capital account 
transactions negatively affect their financial constraints.13  Our results are consistent with these findings.  
Our paper also relates to the research on the effects of the external environment on 
entrepreneurship. Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003), Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2005), and Kumar, 
Rajan, and Zingales (1999) have studied different aspects of the external environment on firm creation and 
entrepreneurship in a cross-section of European countries. Other work on aspects of entrepreneurship 
include Johnson et al.’s (2002) finding that investment by entrepreneurs is lower in countries with weak 
property rights; Black and Strahan’s (2002) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales’ (2004) finding that financial 
development fosters firm entry; Giannetti and Ongena’s (2005) study of the effects of foreign bank lending 
on the growth of Eastern European firms; Fisman and Sarria-Allende’s (2005) study of the effects of 
regulation of entry on the quantity and average size of firms; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine’s 
(2006) finding that financial development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small firms; and 
Acemoglu, Jonhson and Mitton (2005) cross-country study of concentration and vertical integration. Most 
of these papers, with the exception of the latter two, use data from the Amadeus dataset (which has firm 
rather than plant level data for Western and Eastern Europe only) or the Worldscope database (which 
includes information for a large number of countries but covers only relatively large, publicly trade firms).14 
Our paper contributes to this literature by exploring the determinants of entrepreneurship and firm 
                                                 
13 The authors use large publicly traded firm level data for 38 countries and 7079 firms from the Worldscope data base.  
In contrast, Harrison and McMillian (2003), find that in the Ivory Coast for the period 1974-1987 borrowing by foreign 
firms aggravated domestic firms’ credit constraints.  
14 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005) use data for 769,100 firms from the 2002 WorldBase file; Beck et al. (2006) 
use industry level data complemented by U.S. Census data; Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2005) complement industry 
data from UNIDO with Worldscope data for a sample of 34 countries. Publicly listed firms account for only 25 percent 
of jobs, even in the United States (Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2006). Although it is difficult to quantify this 
number for our broad sample of countries, presumably, publicly traded firms are of much greater importance in the 
United States than in most other countries. 
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dynamism in a broader sample of developed and developing countries using data for both private and public 
firms.15   
 Finally, by focusing on micro effects, our results contribute to the broader debate on the effects of 
international financial integration. As argued by Schumpeter, firm entry is a critical part of an economy’s 
dynamism. Previous work has documented the important effects of new firm entry and economic dynamism 
on economic growth. Obstacles to this process can have severe macroeconomic consequences. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper to document and study the relation between firm dynamism and 
international financial integration.16 Our results suggest that, contrary to the fears of many, capital mobility 
has not hindered entrepreneurship. Instead, international financial integration has been associated with 
greater firm activity. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the 
main empirical results. Section 4 discusses potential channels and presents evidence consistent with the 
main results. Section 5 concludes.  
2   Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1  Firm Level Data 
 We use data from WorldBase, a database of public and private companies in more than 213 
countries and territories.  For each firm, WorldBase reports the four-digit SIC-1987 code of the primary 
industry in which each firm operates, and for a few countries the SIC codes of up to five secondary 
industries, listed in descending order of importance. Dun & Bradstreet compiles the WorldBase data from a 
number of sources with a view of providing its clients contact details and basic operating information about 
potential customers, competitors, and suppliers. Sources include partner firms in dozens of countries, from 
telephone directory records, websites, and self-registering firms.17 All information is verified centrally via a 
                                                 
15 Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) provide evidence for the process of creative destruction across 24 
countries and two-digit industries.  
16 International competition is an important source of creative destruction. Researchers have documented significant 
productivity, firm dynamism, and reallocation effects from trade openness with positive effects for specific countries. 
See Caballero (2006) for an overview of empirical evidence. 
17 Firms self-register to receive a widely recognized DUNS business identification number.  
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variety of manual and automated checks. Information from local insolvency authorities and merger and 
acquisition records are used to track changes in ownership and operations.  
 Another advantage of the WorldBase data is that its unit of record is the “establishment” rather than 
the firm. Establishments like firms have their own addresses, business names, and managers, but might be 
partly or wholly owned by other firms. Our data is thus able to capture new entrepreneurial ventures owned 
and capitalized by existing firms as well as by private entrepreneurs.  
 We use data for 2004, excluding establishments missing primary industry and year started 
information.18 We also excluded territories with fewer than 80 observations, establishments for which the 
World Bank provides no data, and government related firms (SIC 9). With these restrictions, our final data 
set includes more than 24 million observations in 98 countries. The criteria used to clean the sample are 
detailed in the Data Appendix. Table 1 lists the countries represented in the data set.  
2.1.1 Sample Frame 
 In our final sample, the number of observations per country ranges from more than 7 million firms 
in the United States to fewer than 90 firms in Burkina Faso (see Table 1). This variation reflects differences 
in country size, but also differences in the intensity with which Dun & Bradstreet samples firms in different 
countries and in the number of firms in the informal sector. This raises concerns that our measures of 
entrepreneurship might be affected by cross-country differences in the sample frame. For example, in 
countries where coverage is lower or where there are a large number of firms in the informal sector (which 
are not captured in our data), more established enterprises –often older and larger firms– may be 
overrepresented in the sample. This may bias our results if the country characteristics which determine the 
intensity of sampling are correlated with our explanatory variables.  
 We address this concern in a number of ways. We compare our results for 2004 and 1999 and study 
how changes in our measures of entrepreneurship between these time periods relate to changes in capital 
restrictions and capital mobility. This gives us more confidence that our results are not driven by the sample 
                                                 
18 We use data for 2004. We also use information for 1999-2000 (close to 6 million observations) in the difference-in-
differences section. The coverage of this sample is more limited. We performed a similar analysis with these data 
obtaining similar results (available upon request). 
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frame, although it is still possible that changes in sampling procedure are correlated with changes in 
financial integration over the same period.19 Second, we repeat our specifications for subsamples which 
include only the rich countries which are the most intensively sampled by Dun & Bradstreet. Third, we deal 
with the possibility that our results might be driven by a small number of observations in country/industry 
pairs by excluding outliers and weighting country/industry pairs by the number of observations in the 
industry. Fourth we include a measure of country sampling intensity in our regressions and find that our 
results are robust.20  Fifth, in the robustness section we include a measure of the size of the informal sector. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the variety of sources from which the data are collected avoids a 
sample selection problem presented in previous studies. Because many international databases collect firm 
data from national authorities, samples drawn from such sources will vary across countries with the 
parameters of the national statistical agency’s reporting requirements. The sample of firms entered into the 
database from different countries is thus not random but determined by the local institutional environment. 
These reporting requirements may be correlated with other national characteristics, potentially biasing the 
results. The wide variety of sources from which Dun & Bradstreet collects data reduces the likelihood that 
the sample frame will be determined by national institutional characteristics. In the Data Appendix, we 
compare the Dun & Bradstreet data to the United States (for which there is broader coverage). The 
comparison illustrates that our data set seem to be well suited for our analysis.  
2.2  Entrepreneurship Measurements 
 How to measure entrepreneurship? Given the different perspectives in the literature on the role of 
entrepreneurs in an economy, definitions have emphasized a broad range of activities including the 
introduction of innovation (Schumpeter, 1942), bearing of risk (Knight, 1921), bringing together of factors 
of production (Say, 1803), and pursuit of opportunity without regard to resources currently controlled 
                                                 
19 A comparison of the 2004 and 1999 samples and conversations with Dun & Bradstreet suggest that this is unlikely to 
be the case.   
20 We use the ratio of the number of firms in the database to GDP. We attempted to control for employment data at the 
industry level to get a sense of coverage, but these data were not available consistently for our cross-section of 
countries for 2004. 
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(Sahlman et al., 1999). In general, entrepreneurs are risk-bearers, coordinators and organizers, gap-fillers, 
leaders, and innovators or creative imitators. 
 If there is no one way to define entrepreneurship, there is certainly no one way to measure it.  
Hence, we use a variety of proxies commonly used in the literature.21 Following Black and Strahan (2002), 
Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2005), we calculate for each 
industry/country pair the rate of entry, average firm size, the skewness of firm size, age, and vintage.22  
 i. Firm Entry. Firm entry is defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of firms 
in the country/industry pair.23 Markets that provide an opportunity for more startup firms are said to be more 
dynamic and entrepreneurial. Greater access to capital and improvements in a country’s financial markets 
associated with international financial integration should ease capital constraints and positively influence 
entry decisions in a country. 24     
 ii. Firm Size Distribution. Small firms play an important role in the economy as they are often 
portrayed as sources of innovation, regeneration, change and employment. We examine the relation between 
skewness of the firm-size distribution and international financial integration. If capital constraints, for 
example, are operative in shaping the nature of industrial activity, the firm-size distribution should be 
skewed.25 We also calculate average firm size measured by the log of the average number of employees in 
each country/industry pair. Although the prediction is not unambiguous, we expect lower levels of capital 
rationing associated with international financial integration to result in greater numbers of small firms being 
able to enter and survive in the market.    
 iii. Age. In the robustness section, we use average age in each industry/country pair. Young firms, in 
particular, are said to invigorate an economy. We expect greater financial integration to be associated with 
more dynamic business environments and lower average firm age. 
                                                 
21 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) publishes indices of entrepreneurial activity. These data did not seem 
to be empirically consistent with other measures used in the literature and hence are not used in this paper.  
22 Throughout the rest of the paper we use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably. 
23 Due to lags in reporting and collecting, we classify a firm as new if it less than two years old. See Klapper, Laeven, 
and Rajan (2005) for a similar treatment. 
24 This might depend on whether a country is exporting or importing capital, but there might still be an improvement in 
intermediation of capital. 
25 Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Cabral and Mata (2003) argue that in the presence of capital constraints firm size 
distribution will be skewed.  
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 iv. Vintage. We also use in the robustness section a weighted average measure of age.  Following 
Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) vintage is the weighted (by numbers of employees) average age of the 
firms in each country/industry pair. This measure shows the importance of young firms to the productive 
capacity of an industry. Vintage provides a broader measure of where the mass of industrial activity is over 
average firm size. Low vintage indicates that young firms dominate the productive capacity. As the authors 
explain, if, for example, lower capital constraints make it easier to get external financing at earlier stages, 
the young sector would be, on average, smaller. At the same time, if firms survive to become older (that is, 
do not exit or fail as frequently), the fraction of actual employment in the young sector would be lower. In 
this case, for example, average firm size would be lower and vintage higher. The predictions with respect to 
vintage are not unambiguous, although we expect smaller, younger firms to benefit from greater access to 
international funds.   
 The Data Appendix explains all variables in detail.  
2.3  Capital Mobility Data 
How to measure international financial integration? Assessing a country’s integration with 
international financial markets is a complicated task. The process, that is, the change in the degree to which 
a country’s government restricts cross-border financial transactions, is complex and involves multiple 
phases. Markets can be liberalized gradually and the effects smoothed if the reforms can be anticipated.26 
The literature, as we observed earlier, differentiates between de jure financial integration associated with 
policies on capital account liberalization and de facto measures related to actual capital flows. De jure 
liberalization processes might not reflect de facto liberalization processes. If, for example, one part of the 
system is liberalized, investors might use it to circumvent other controls. Some reforms might not be 
credible, and countries, albeit officially open, might nevertheless not have access to foreign capital. Hence, 
we use both measures of financial integration.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Anticipation and gradualness should bias our results away from finding an effect. 
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2.3.1 De Jure Measures  
 Most empirical analyses that require a measure of capital account restrictions use an index 
constructed from data in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This is a rule-based indicator in that it focuses on de 
jure restrictions imposed by the legal authorities in each country as compiled by the IMF’s AREAER. The 
index is constructed from data on restrictions presented in the survey appendix. In 1997, the IMF changed 
the way they report the capital controls data. The new classification provides greater detail than the 
presented prior to 1997.  We use the newer format. The index uses data from different restrictions: capital 
market securities; money market instruments; collective investment securities; derivatives and other 
instruments; commercial credits; financial credits; guarantees, securities, and financial backup facilities; 
direct investment; real estate transactions; and personal capital transactions. A corresponding dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if each of the restrictions is present in each country, zero otherwise.27 We use 
for each country the average of the restrictions.  
2.3.2 De Facto Measures 
 Capital flows are usually divided into flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity 
investment, and debt inflows. FDI data include greenfield investments (construction of new factories), 
equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and financial derivatives associated with various inter-
company transactions between affiliated enterprises. Portfolio equity investment includes shares, stock 
participations, and similar documents that usually denote ownership of equity. Debt inflows include bonds, 
debentures, notes, and money market or negotiable debt instruments. We also use data on financial 
derivatives flows, which are relatively small for most countries. 
 Our analysis employs mainly the following  measures of de facto capital mobility.  
                                                 
27 Note that the way the IMF index is constructed results in a general indicator. The new classification is a vast 
improvement over the previous measure, although issues regarding circumvention of controls remain. Quinn (1997) 
improves the IMF restriction measure by reading through the IMF’s narrative descriptions and assigning scores for the 
intensity of capital restrictions. This measure is not available for our sample year and coverage.   
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 i. Capital Inflows/GDP: Capital inflows to GDP are the sum of the change in the liabilities of FDI, 
equity portfolio, financial derivatives, and debt from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data 
are calculated as a percentage of GDP as reported in the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI).   
 ii. Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment/GDP, Net: Using net inflows of FDI as a percentage of 
GDP emphasizes the potential benefits derived from FDI associated with technological transfers, knowledge 
spillovers, and linkages that go beyond the capital foreign firms might bring into a country. Data are from 
the World Bank, WDI. 
 iii. Stock of Foreign Liabilities/GDP: In our analysis, the stock of foreign liabilities proxies the 
thickness of banking and equity relationships (both FDI and portfolio investment) with other countries. This 
variable thus captures the effects of existing foreign capital relations on current entrepreneurial activity. The 
data are from Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006), whose estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and their 
subcomponents for different countries in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were recently updated to 2004. The 
data are calculated as a percentage of GDP. 
 iv. Gross Capital Flows/GDP: Gross private capital flows to GDP are the sum of the absolute 
values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments 
financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general 
government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP in U.S. dollars. The trade literature frequently 
uses the sum of exports and imports to GDP as a measure of openness. Similarly, gross capital flows to 
GDP capture a country’s overall foreign capital activity. Data are from the World Bank, WDI. 
 The following measures are also used in the robustness section.  
 v. Equity Inflows/GDP: We use this variable to assess the relation between entrepreneurial activity 
and equity flows of capital (sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows from IFS, IMF). 
 vi. Net Capital Flows/GDP: Net flows to GDP allow us to focus on the net capital available to the 
economy. Net flows are the sum of flows of foreign claims on domestic capital (change in liabilities) and 
flows of domestic claims on foreign capital (change in assets) in a given year. Coverage for this variable is 
more limited and is from the IMF, IFS statistics. 
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2.4  Other Controls   
The literature has found the institutional and business environment as well as industry 
characteristics to affect the levels of entrepreneurial activity in a country.  
In the main specification we use the (logarithm of) GDP per capita to proxy for development. The 
level of economic development is likely to affect the attractiveness/success of becoming an entrepreneur. 
We use the (logarithm of) GDP to control for scale effects that might affect entrepreneurial activity. We 
control for the rate of real GDP growth to capture current economic activity. These variables are from the 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WB, WDI). In addition, we use various controls for 
institutional quality. We use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication 
of Political Risk Services. We use specifically the variables non-corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic 
quality, all of which we expect to be positively related to entrepreneurial activity.28 We also use the number 
of days required to start a business from the World Bank, WDI. We expect this variable to have a negative 
impact on entrepreneurial activity.  
In the robustness section, we use additional controls for regulation such as a business disclosure 
index, legal rights of borrowers and lenders index, and share of the informal sector. To control for financial 
development, we use domestic credit on GDP and the stock market capitalization to GDP. To capture 
uncertainty in the macro-economy, we use inflation. We also control for trade flows and use the sum of 
exports and imports over GDP. All of these variables were taken from the WB, WDI.   Finally, we use 
growth forecasts from Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) as an imperfect control for a country’s exogenous 
growth opportunities.  Detailed descriptions of all data are provided in the Data Appendix.   
                                                 
28 ICRG presents information on the following variables: investment profile, government stability, internal conflict, 
external conflict, no-corruption, non-militarized politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection 
from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. We do not use the entire index as we do not 
have, a priori, a view on how some of these variables might affect entrepreneurial activity, and suspect that some might 
have opposite effects. 
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3   Empirical Analysis 
3.1  Summary Statistics  
 Table 1 presents summary statistics by country for our main variables. We have for the United 
States, for example, more than 7 million firms. France follows with more than 4 million. At the other end of 
the spectrum, we have Zimbabwe with 99 firms and Burkina Faso with 87. There is clearly wide variation in 
entrepreneurial activity across countries. Countries such as Denmark, Netherlands, and South Korea exhibit 
high firm creation, Papua New Guinea and Yemen relatively low firm creation, in 2004. Median 
employment per firm was relatively high for Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Thailand and relatively low 
for Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. Table 2 presents summary statistics by industry at the two-digit SIC 
code level. The service sector shows, overall, higher entry rates and lower median employment levels. Table 
3 presents summary statistics on de jure and de facto capital mobility. Countries such as Costa Rica, 
Netherlands, and Belgium have low levels of de jure restrictions according to the IMF index, while 
Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea and Thailand high levels of restrictions. There is also widespread variability 
in de facto flows of capital.29 Table 4 reports summary statistics for our main control variables. In countries 
such as Australia and Canada it takes from two to three days to start a business; in Brazil and India more 
than 150 days. There is also great variation in terms of corruption and bureaucratic quality. Table 5 presents 
the correlation matrix of the main variables. Our data seem to be not only internally consistent, but also 
consistent with other studies of firm dynamics reported in the literature.30 
 Figure 1, as mentioned, plots the firm-size distribution measured by the number of employees for 
countries with high and low de jure restrictions to capital mobility. The figure shows there to be higher 
entrepreneurial activity in countries with lower restrictions. Figure 2, presents for low and high capital 
controls countries histograms of firm entry by industry, each industry observation weighted by the number 
of firms. Similarly, the figure shows firm activity to be higher in countries with fewer controls.  
                                                 
29 Ireland experienced particularly high flows and in particular gross flows during this period. Results are robust to 
excluding Ireland from the sample. 
30 See Bartelsman, Hatliwanger, Sarpetta (2004).  
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 These figures, however, do not control for industry composition within countries or the level of 
development or activity in a country, which might be related to the level of de jure restrictions. We consider 
these issues in the following section. 
3.2  Cross Sectional Analysis  
 The purpose of the cross-sectional analysis is to investigate whether there are variations in 
entrepreneurial activity across countries that are correlated with capital mobility (de jure or de facto). We 
run the following specification,  
iciccic XK εδβα +++=Ε   (1) 
where icΕ corresponds to the entrepreneurial activity measure in industry i of country c, Kc corresponds to 
the measure of capital account integration, Xc  corresponds to country level controls, iδ is a full set of 
industry dummies, and εic corresponds to the error term. Our analysis is at the two-digit industry level. The 
industry dummies control for cross-industry differences in technological level or other determinants of 
entrepreneurship.31 Hence, in equation (1), we look at whether, in the same industry, firms in a country with 
greater capital mobility exhibit more entrepreneurial activity than firms in a country with less capital 
mobility. In other words, cross-country comparisons are relative to the mean propensity to “generate 
entrepreneurial activity” in an industry. The estimation procedure uses White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity in the error term. Because the capital mobility variables vary only at the country level, we 
present results with standard errors corrected at the country level (clustering).   
 In our main regressions, we run specification (1) on the different measures of entrepreneurship: 
entry, firm size, and skewness of the firm-size distribution, and on different measures of capital account 
integration, namely, the IMF index, capital inflows, FDI inflows, stock foreign liabilities, and gross flows. 
Appendix A presents results for the additional measure of entrepreneurship and capital mobility. Our main 
control variables are (log of) GDP, (log of) GDP per capita, GDP growth, days to start a business, and 
                                                 
31 Klepper and Graddy’s (1990) results point to the importance of industry characteristics in firm’s entry and exit 
patterns. Dunne and Roberts (1991), who describe certain industry characteristics that explain much of inter-industry 
variation in turnover rates, find the correlation between those industry characteristics and industry turnover pattern to 
be relatively stable over time.  
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indices of bureaucracy, non-corruption, and law and order. We use weights in the regressions to reflect the 
different size of each industry/country observation. We find that our results are similar when unweighted, 
and when weighted by either the number of firms or the total employment in the industry/country. For many 
industries, the rate of firm entry is zero or negligible. To account for this large number of zeros and our 
upper bound at 1, we use a Tobit estimation model for the firm entry regressions.32 This specification allows 
us to observe a regression line that is not heavily weighted by the large number of industries with a wide 
range of characteristics but which did not generate any observed new firms in our sample period. 
 Table 6a-6c presents the main results that, overall, suggest a negative and significant relation 
between different measures of entrepreneurial activity and restrictions on capital mobility. 
 Table 6a presents results for firm entry as the dependent variable. In column (1), the marginal effect 
of the IMF index conditional on the dependent variable (rate of firm entry) being uncensored is -5.99. This 
result is both economically and statistically significant. Consider a movement from the 25th percentile 
(Ghana, 0.77) to the 75th percentile (New Zealand, 0.15) in the distribution of the index of restrictions. 
Based on the results shown in column (1), we have, on average, 3.7 percent more entry in an industry in the 
country with less restrictive controls. This represents, in industries with average rates of entry such as 
textiles and apparel, an 82 percent increase in entry over average entry.33 Columns (2)-(5) present the main 
results of controlling for de facto measures of capital account integration. A movement from the 25th 
percentile (Mauritius, 2.36) to the 75th percentile (Greece, 14.2) of the Capital Inflows/GDP variable is 
associated, based on the results in column (2), with an increase in entry of 0.31, which represents a 7 percent 
increase in entry over average entry. Similarly, based on the results in column (3), an inter-quartile range 
movement in the FDI/GDP variable is associated with an increase in FDI/GDP of 0.44, which is a 10 
percent increase over the industry average.   
 In terms of the other control variables, our results are in line with the literature. Levels of 
development and growth are positively related to entrepreneurship, and we find a significant positive effect 
                                                 
32 Entry regressions are not clustered. Several clustered entry estimates using Tobit were not significant at standard 
levels. These results, however, do not contradict our main findings. We believe the loss of robustness in our estimates 
to be due to computational issues. Tobit is a non-linear estimator, clustering another large-sample asymptotic 
approximation. Together these techniques might be giving us more imprecise estimates. When we ran the regression 
using OLS and clustering, the results were significant.  
33 Average entry in uncensored industries is 4.5 percent. 
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of non-corruption and law and order. Days required to start a business has a negative and significant effect 
on entrepreneurship. To give some sense of the relative size of the effect of our capital mobility variable 
relative to our controls, if we move up from the 25th percentile (U.K) to the 75th percentile (Philippines) in 
the distribution of the days to start a business variable (a difference of 32 days), based on the results shown 
in column (2) we have, on average, 2.5 percent less entry in an industry.34  This represents, in industries 
with average rates of entry such as textiles and apparel, a 55 percent decrease in entry over average entry, 
which is significantly less than the effect of a similar inter-quartile change in the IMF index.  
 In Table 6b, the dependent variable is the log of employment in the industry/country pair. As seen in 
column (1), an inter-quartile reduction in the IMF index (less restrictive controls) is associated with a 
decrease in average firm size by 32 percent. Similar increases in the Capital Inflows/GDP and FDI/GDP 
variables are associated with decreases in average firm size of 72 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The 
small FDI coefficient is expected as FDI is often associated with the entry of large firms.    
 In table 6c, the dependent variable is skewness of the firm-size distribution. We believe this variable 
to constitute the most complete characterization of firm activity in the economy. Column (1) of the table 
shows the effect of the IMF index on the skewness of the firm size distribution in each industry to be 
negative and significant. To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect of a reduction in the IMF index on the 
level of entrepreneurial activity, consider a movement from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in the 
distribution of the index of restrictions; based on the results shown in column (1), we see a 5.43 reduction in 
skewness, which represents 46 percent of average industry skewness. In terms of the effect of de facto 
measures of integration on the firm size distribution, a similar interquantile movement of the Capital 
Inflows/GDP variable is associated, based on the results in column (2), with an increase in skewness of 
2.77, which represents a 24 percent increase over the industry average.  
 We performed additional robustness checks some of which we report on Appendix A. Table A1 
shows our results to be robust to controlling for other measures of regulation and level of domestic financial 
development as well as other macroeconomic controls. Table A2 uses additional proxies for 
entrepreneurship, such as age, firm vintage, and domestic entry, as well as other measures of de facto 
                                                 
34 In column 1, the marginal effect of the IMF index variable conditional on the dependent variable being uncensored is 
-0.0077. 
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financial integration such as equity inflows and net flows. Table A3 shows our results to be robust to using 
only the manufacturing sector, only developing countries, excluding the United States from the sample, and 
adding regional dummies.  
 Appendix B presents the results of using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology and focusing 
on cross-industry, cross-country interaction effects. Following these authors, we use the Unites States as a 
proxy for the “natural” rate of entry and entrepreneurial activity in an industry. We test then whether entry 
and skewness of the firm size distribution are relatively higher or lower in a naturally-high-activity industry 
when the country allows for international capital mobility.  As seen in the Table B1 our main results remain 
robust to using this methodology.  
3.3  Difference in Differences  
 We compare our results for 2004 and 1999 using an event study based on the difference in 
differences (DiD) method (Card and Krueger, 1994). We measure the difference between the level of 
entrepreneurship in the two periods for the group of countries which experienced liberalization in the 
interim, and for the control group of countries which did not. The difference in differences is the difference 
between these two measures. This model differences out all the individual characteristics of each 
observation and thereby controls for more heterogeneity than the cross-sectional estimation. The model is: 
icIcic dDXLD νβγ +++=Ε   (2) 
where L indicates whether the country experienced liberalization as measured by a reduction in the IMF 
index. γ is the parameter of interest and captures the difference between the change in entrepreneurship in 
liberalized countries and the change in control countries. The DiD estimator is given by 
0/1/ˆ == −= LicLic DEDEγ . The estimation procedure uses White’s correction for heteroskedasticity in the 
error term and errors are clustered at the country level. The key identifying assumption in this model is that 
in the absence of liberalization, both the liberalized and control observations would have experienced the 
same change in entrepreneurship over the period. Having only two periods of data, our ability to test this 
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assumption is limited. For this reason we interpret the results from this specification with some caution. We 
do however include differenced control variables.  
 In our sample, 56% per cent of countries in our sample had a lower IMF index in 2004 than in 
1999.35 Differences between the statistics summarizing the measures of entrepreneurship in the two samples 
are generally small. Tables 7a and 7b present the main DiD results for de jure and de facto restrictions on 
international financial integration, which suggest a positive and significant relation between different 
measures of entrepreneurial activity and capital mobility. Table 7a presents results for entry, Table 7b 
results for skewness.36 In terms of economic magnitude, Table 7b, column (1), for example, indicates that 
industries in countries which liberalized in the period had a firm size distribution which, on average, had a 
higher skewness than countries which did not liberalize by 7.03 equivalent to 44 percent of the mean 
industry skewness. Appendix Table A4 shows the results to be robust to using only the manufacturing 
sector, restricting the sample to only developing countries, and excluding the United States from the sample. 
Overall, the results across two cross-sections of the same data give us some confidence that our results are 
not driven by correlations between the sampling intensity of our data provider and capital flows, generating 
apparent correlations between observed industry characteristics and capital mobility.   
3.4  Endogeneity  
 Important concerns related to the previous findings include whether a potential omitted third factor 
explains the relation between the different measures of entrepreneurship and international financial 
integration and whether reverse causality might be driving our results. We take different steps to mitigate 
these concerns.37   
 First, we believe the extensive robustness analysis undertaken in Appendix A shows the relation 
between entrepreneurship and international financial integration not to be determined by an omitted third 
                                                 
35 Summary statistics for 1999 and 2004 are, respectively, 0.52 and 0.49 for the IMF Index, 12.91 and 11.80 for Capital 
Inflows/GDP, 5.19 and 2.74 for FDI Inflows/GDP, 30.84 and 29.45 for Gross Capital Flows/GDP, and 125.73 and 
142.35 for Stock of Foreign Liabilities/GDP. For the entrepreneurship measures, average entry for 1999 and 2004 was, 
respectively, 7.56 and 4.53, skewness of employment 6.07 and 9.52. 
36 We obtain similar results for log size, not included due to space considerations (skewness provides a more complete 
characterization of the data). 
37 In section 2.2.1, we discuss potential sampling biases and the different ways we addressed these concerns.  
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factor. Second, we use in addition to de facto measures de jure measures that are less likely to be subject to 
reverse causality.38 Third, we analyze firm/industry characteristics as opposed to country characteristics and 
test effects controlling for the different sectors. Fourth, we use as an imperfect proxy of forward-looking 
growth opportunities (growth forecasts from the EIU).39 Reassuringly, as shown in Table 1, columns (8) and 
(9), our results are robust to including this measure.   
 We also run instrumental variable (IV) regressions using instruments that are not subject to reverse 
causality and can account for institutional variation. La Porta et al. (1998) examine the laws that govern 
investor protection, the enforcement of these laws, and the extent of concentration of firm ownership across 
countries. Most countries’ legal rules, either through colonialism, conquest, or outright borrowing, can be 
traced to one of four distinct European legal systems: English common law, French civil law, German civil 
law, and Scandinavian civil law. The authors find that countries with different legal histories o offer 
different types of legal protection to their investors. These legal origin variables have been increasingly 
adopted as exogenous determinants of international financial liberalization and domestic financial 
development. The last column in Table 2 presents IV results using the legal origin variables.40 Criticism of 
these instruments notwithstanding, overall, the IV regression supports the conclusions drawn from the OLS 
regressions.  
 Finally, as explained before, in Appendix B we also follow the methodology of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and focus on cross-industry, cross-country interaction effects. This methodology allows correcting 
for country and industry characteristics and as the authors explain, it is less subject to criticism about 
omitted variable bias or model specification. Similarly, our difference in different results further ease 
concerns about endogeneity biases.  
                                                 
38 In particular, it might be possible that policy makers liberalize at a time when the world economy is booming or after 
they observe good economic outcomes. But this does not seem to be borne out by the facts. Henry (2000), for example, 
shows that countries do not pursue stock market liberalization in response to investment booms, and Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad (2005) find, using a probit analysis, that past GDP growth cannot explain liberalization.  
39 One potential concern is that the data set is for a good year in the international arena (2004). As well as analyzing the 
differences between the two time periods, we rerun our cross-section specifications with our 1999-2000 data set (post 
Asia and Russia crises, during the Brazil crisis, and before Turkey and Argentina crises) obtaining similar results.  
40 First stage results indicate that the legal origin variables are, individually and jointly, significant determinants of the 
IMF index.  
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 Notwithstanding the battery of robustness tests, we acknowledge the difficulties of establishing 
causation.  At our most cautious, we can conclude that we find a robust positive correlation between capital 
mobility and entrepreneurship.  
4   Channels  
 The Dun & Bradstreet data enable us to investigate possible channels through which international 
financial integration might affect entrepreneurial activity. That is, whether capital mobility affects 
entrepreneurship through a change in the activity of domestic firms in contact with foreign firms (an FDI 
channel) or through the availability of resources (a capital/credit availability channel). 
4.1 FDI Channel  
 We first test for the effect of international financial integration on entrepreneurial activity through 
foreign firms’ (FDI) influence on the creation of new domestic firms. Our data contain information on the 
nationality of each firm’s ownership, which enables us to directly test the FDI channel through the presence 
of foreign-owned firms. Initially, we investigate the effects of foreign firms on new domestic firms in the 
same industry. Specifically, we run 
icicicic XFirmsForeignofSharentryDomestic εδβα +++=Ε  (3) 
where Domestic Entryic refers to the percentage of new domestic firms in sector i in country c. The Share of 
Foreign Firmsic in sector i is the number of foreign firms calculated as total firms in industry i in country c.  
Xc represents country-level controls.41   
 In columns (1) and (4) of Table 8, we find the presence of foreign firms to have a positive effect on 
domestic activity in the same industry. An increase in the share of foreign firms equivalent to moving from 
an industry in the 25th percentile of the distribution of foreign presence to an industry in the 75th percentile is 
associated with an increase in the percentage of new domestic firms in the industry by 4.67 points, or a 102 
percent increase over an industry with mean levels of foreign firms. There is a large literature examining 
                                                 
41 Note that in this case, both our variable of interest and the dependent variable are aggregated at the industry level. 
Regressions are weighted by number of firms. 
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horizontal spillovers from FDI. Caves (1974), Blomstrom and Persson (1983), and Haskel, Pereira, and 
Slaughter (2002), for instance, find a positive correlation between foreign presence and sectoral 
productivity, and Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) find little evidence of 
horizontal spillovers to domestic firms. The positive effects of FDI are often attributed to the replacement 
effect of productive multinationals forcing domestic firms to exit. Both the positive and negative effects of 
FDI are consistent with industrial restructuring and, ultimately, firm turnover. We find evidence that the 
existence of multinational firms increases the rate of domestic firm creation. This might reflect changes in 
the industry resulting from large new entrants increasing their market share at the expense of some firms and 
creating new opportunities for others.  
 We also test whether our measures of domestic activity are correlated with the presence of 
multinational firms in upstream and downstream sectors. Given the difficulty of finding input and output 
matrices for all the countries in our data, we use U.S. input and output (IO) matrices from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2005). As the authors explain, IO tables 
from the U.S. should be informative about input flows across industries in our different sample of countries 
as long as they are determined by technology. For example, in all countries, car makers use tires, steel and 
plastic from plants specialized in the production of these intermediate inputs. We calculate the presence of 
downstream firms in industry i in country c as  
∑ ×=
j
jcUSjiic WZesenceStreamDown _Pr    (4)  
where Zjc is the ratio of the inputs industry j sources from industry i in the United States to the total output of 
industry i in the United States according to the BEA input output table. And Wjc is the total number of 
foreign firms in industry j in country c as a percentage of the total number of firms in industry j in country c. 
Thus, the presence of foreign firms downstream from industry i is weighted by the volume of goods they 
purchase from industry i. We estimate the following relation:  
icicicic XesencemDownsStreantryDomestic εδβα +++=Ε Pr  (5) 
 We estimated as well a similar regression for upstream presence.  
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 In columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) of Table 8, we investigate the effect of forward and backward 
linkages on the creation of new domestic firms and skewness of the firm-size distribution of domestic firms. 
Columns (2) and (5) show the effect of foreign presence on upstream industries to be limited while columns 
(3) and (6) suggest the presence of foreign firms to have positive effects on entrepreneurial firm activity on 
downstream activities. Our results are also consistent with evidence of vertical spillovers from FDI.42 Firm 
entry (and exit) might be increased if multinational firms’ demand for intermediate goods increases or their 
more stringent requirements for product standards and on-time delivery create opportunities for new firms 
with better technology or better operations. This is consistent with case study evidence from Hobday (1995), 
who found that foreign investments in East Asia encouraged hundreds of domestic firms to supply 
components or assembly services. Our results are also consistent with the findings of Harrison et al. (2004) 
that incoming FDI has a significant impact on investment cash flow sensitivities for domestically owned 
firms and firms with no foreign assets. The authors argue that their results are in line with the hypothesis 
that foreign investment is associated with a greater reduction of credit constraints on firms less likely to 
have access to international capital markets. This is plausible because incoming foreign investment provides 
an additional source of capital, freeing up scare domestic credit which can then be redirected towards 
domestic enterprises.  
 Overall, although our data do not permit to correct for some of the concerns associated with cross-
section analysis, our results are consistent with our previous findings. 
4.2  Capital/Credit Availability Channel 
In addition to an FDI channel, we also investigate the possibility that capital mobility affects 
entrepreneurship through the availability of resources (i.e. a capital /credit availability channel). There is 
considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics.  
We investigate whether firm activity in industries which are more reliant on external finance are positively 
or negatively affected by our measures of international financial integration. We divide our sample into 
                                                 
42 Gorg and Strobl (2002) find that foreign presence encourages entry by domestic-owned firms in the high-tech sector 
in Ireland. Javorcik (2004) finds that FDI fosters spillovers through backward linkages in Lithuania although her work 
does not analyze firm entry patterns. 
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those industries with high dependence on external finance as defined by Rajan and Zingales (1998).43  We 
run the following appended specification,  
 iciciccic XFinanceExternalHighKK εδβθα +++×+=Ε  (6) 
where High External Finance is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for high financial dependence industries.  
We run this specification across de jure (the IMF index) and three de facto measures of capital mobility. 
Table 9 reports our main results. We find entrepreneurship in industries more reliant on external finance to 
be more sensitive to restrictions on capital mobility and more strongly affected by increased flows of 
finance. This result is robust to controlling for financial development proxied by domestic credit to GDP 
and stock market capitalization (not shown).   
5   Conclusions 
 Using a new data set of 24 million firms in nearly 100 countries, we found a positive relation 
between measures of capital account integration and entrepreneurial activity in a country. We describe a 
number of plausible channels through which international financial integration might affect firm dynamism.  
 Concerns related to the data notwithstanding, our evidence suggests, overall, a positive relation 
between entrepreneurial activity and capital mobility. One might argue that from a neoclassical perspective 
our results are to be expected. Access to foreign capital and improved risk sharing should encourage start-
ups and foster opportunities in a country. But from a theoretical perspective, in light of empirical findings 
on capital account liberalization and growth, our results might seem surprising. We believe that more micro 
analysis is required to understand the effects of capital account openness in a country. It is worth 
emphasizing that this work is silent on growth and overall welfare effects of capital liberalization. However, 
at a minimum, the use of micro firm level data should enhance our general understanding of the process by 
which the effects of liberalization are transmitted to the real economy.  
                                                 
43 The authors identify an industry’s need for external finance (the difference between investment and cash generated 
from operations) under two assumptions: (a) that U.S. capital markets, especially for the large, listed firms they 
analyze, are relatively frictionless enabling us to identify an industry’s technological demand for external finance; (b) 
that such technological demands carry over to other countries. Following their methodology, we constructed similar 
data for the period 1999-2003 as explained in the Data Appendix.  
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks 
 We performed additional robustness checks on the regressions results in (1). As Table A1 shows, 
our main results are robust to controlling for other measures of regulation as well as for the level of 
domestic financial development. In columns (1)-(3), we control for indices of borrowers’ and lenders’ rights 
and business disclosure from the World Bank as additional proxies for regulation, and domestic credit to 
GDP and stock market capitalization as proxies for financial development. Our results are also robust to 
controlling for M3/GDP as another proxy for financial development (not shown). Columns (4) and (5) 
control for inflation as a measure of macroeconomic instability. In columns (6) and (7) we use the EIU 
growth forecasts as an imperfect measure of exogenous growth opportunities. As shown in column (8), our 
results are robust to the inclusion of the value of the trade openness defined as the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of output. Column (9) controls for the share of the informal sector in the economy 
obtaining similar results (these data, however, were available for a wide range of countries for 2000 only). 
Controlling for education levels (share of primary school) yielded similar results (not shown, as we do not 
have strong priors on how education levels might affect entrepreneurship, in particular, in developing 
countries).   
 Columns (1)-(3) in Table A2 show our results to be robust to using as additional proxies for 
entrepreneurship firm age, firm vintage (a size-weighted measure of average firm age), and domestic entry, 
respectively. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of de facto financial integration such as net 
flows to GDP in column (4) and equity flows in column (5). Another concern is that our results are driven 
by different sampling intensities in different countries. It might be the case, for example, that countries with 
higher sampling intensity have disproportionately more small firms. Columns (6) and (7) in Table A2, 
which control for the number of firms sampled in each country, suggest that this is not the case. As 
mentioned, our results are also weighted. Column (9) presents IV results using LLSV variables.  
 Table A3 shows our results to be robust to using only the manufacturing sector in column (1), only 
rich countries in column (2), excluding the United States from the sample in column (3), and adding 
regional dummies in column (4).  
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 In terms of the differences in differences approach, Table A4 shows our results to be robust to (1) 
using only the manufacturing sector, (2) using only rich countries, and (3) excluding the United States. 
Appendix B: Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) Methodology  
 We follow the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2005) 
and focus on cross-industry, cross-country interaction effects. This methodology, as explained by the 
authors, enables us to address issues associated with country effects.44 We run:  
icciciic KZ εγδθ +++×=Ε )(   (A.1) 
where icΕ corresponds the entrepreneurial activity measure in industry i of country c, δi  corresponds to 
industry dummies, and γc corresponds to country level dummies. The industry indicators correct for 
industry-specific effects; country dummies correct for country-specific variables. The focus of analysis is on 
the interaction term θ between a country characteristic (Kc) and an industry characteristic, Zi. For country 
characteristics, we use the capital mobility measures. For industry characteristics, we follow these authors in 
using the United States as a proxy for the “natural” entrepreneurial activity in an industry reflecting 
technological barriers in that industry like economies of scale. “Of course, there is a degree of heroism in 
assuming that entry in the United States does not suffer from artificial barriers,” write Klapper, Laeven, and 
Rajan (2005, p.17). But the methodology requires only that rank ordering in the United States correspond to 
the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and the latter rank ordering correspond to that of other 
countries. 
 Our hypothesis is that if international financial integration improves entrepreneurial activity, the 
coefficient on the interaction term θ will be positive as we expect industries with higher potential levels of 
entrepreneurship to be more negatively affected by constraints on access to foreign capital. Table B1 reports 
the main results. Focusing on entry and the skewness of the firm size-distribution, we find θ to be positive 
and significant for the different proxies of capital integration. Moreover, the magnitude of the relationship is 
                                                 
44 This is equivalent to de-meaning the variables using their industry and country averages and thus removing some of 
the sample selection problems. The interpretation of a positive coefficient on the interaction term would be that in 
countries with above average capital mobility, industries with above average “country characteristics” have higher than 
average rates of firm entry. For a detailed description of their methodology, see Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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economically significant. For example, an increase in the inflows of capital equivalent to an increase from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile in our sample (11.5 percent) reduces the percentage of new firms in an industry 
with average levels of entrepreneurship in the US (e.g. rubber products, 4.5 percent) by 0.05 points.  
Data Appendix I:  The Dun and Bradstreet Data Set 
a. Final Sample 
 We use data for 2004, excluding information lacking primary industry and year started. Our original 
data set included 118 countries. We excluded territories with fewer than 80 observations and those for 
which the World Bank provides no data (most were in Africa and had fewer than 20 firms). The final dataset 
of 24,606,036 establishments in 98 countries covers all economic sectors (SIC) with the exception of Public 
Administration (Division J, group 9) and sector 43 (United States Postal Service). We also dropped all 
establishments for which year started preceded 1900. When we estimated mean, median, and skewness, we 
dropped 6 observations that were clearly outliers: a firm with sales of 648.7 trillions in Denmark, a firm 
with sales of 219.3 trillions in Spain, a firm with sales of 219.3 billions in Spain, a firm with sales of 32.7 
trillions in Germany, a firm with sales of 5,6 trillions in Lithuania, a firm with sales of 4.9 trillions in United 
Arab Emirates, a firm with sales of 352 billions in Nigeria, a firm with sales of 291 billions in Chad, a firm 
with sales of 291 billions in Angola, a firm with sales of 121 billions in Congo, and a firm with sales of 99 
billions in Haiti. We retained data with certain information (e.g., employment) but missing other 
information (e.g., sales), which was the case mostly in less developed countries (Africa, in particular), our 
objective being to maximize the number of observations for these countries. In the estimations of mean, 
median, and skewness using employees, we excluded establishments that reported 0 in this category. The 
creation rate shows the number of establishments reporting starting year in 2003-2004 over all 
establishments. We define foreign firms as having an uppermost parent of a corporate family located in a 
country different from that in which the firm operates. In terms of sample biases, we discussed with Dun & 
Bradstreet the possibility of over-sampling in countries with lower levels of controls or higher capital 
mobility (such as foreign direct investment). The firm did not seem to believe this to be a bias in its 
sampling strategy. In the case of Czech Republic, a country with high sampling intensity, 
Dun & Bradstreet derives the bulk of its information from official registries. 
 
b. Comparing Dun & Bradstreet Data and US Census Data 
To give some sense of the coverage of the Dun & Bradstreet sample used in this study, 
we compare our data with that collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses. The U.S. 2001-2002 business census recorded 24,846,832 establishments.45 
Our data include 6,185,542 establishments (from which we exclude establishments in the 
total sample without the year started). About three quarters of all U.S. establishments 
have no payroll. Most are self-employed persons operating unincorporated businesses 
that might or might not be the owner's principal source of income. The U.S. census 
records 7,200,770 employer establishments with total sales of $22 trillion. Our data 
include 4,293,886 establishments with more than one employee with total sales of $17 
trillion. The U.S. census records 3.7 million small employer establishments (fewer than 
10 employees). Our data include 3.2 million U.S. firms with more than one and fewer 
than 10 employees. This high proportion of small firms in the database could be evidence 
of oversampling of small firms or underreporting of firm size. In our data, 6.1 percent of 
establishments are new.46 The U.S. Census reported 12.4 percent of establishments to be 
new in 2001-2002.47,48
 
 
45 The unit of record in the Dun & Bradstreet data is the “establishment” (a single physical location where 
business is conducted or services or industrial operations are performed) as opposed to a “firm” (one or 
more domestic establishments under common ownership or control). The U.S. census collects information 
on establishments as well as firms. 
46 We define as new an establishment having a year started date less than two years previous. 
47Establishment and Employment Changes from Births, Deaths, Expansions, and Contractions, 
http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/usst01_02.xls. 
48 For firms with 1-4 employees this was 15.9 percent, for firms with more than 500 employees 11 percent. 
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Firm Level Data From Worldbase - Dun & Bradstreet. In the analysis, we use 2 dig
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ployment (Log) of the average firm size measured by the number of employees for each country/industry pair.
Entry Percentage of firm entry defined as the number new firms in t divided by the total number of firms in the country/industry pair. Due to lags in data reporting
and collection, we classify a new firm as new if it is less than two years old.
Age Average age of the firms for each country/industry pair.
Vintage Vintage is constructed within each country/industry pair and it is the weighted average age of the firms in each industry, the weights being given by the total
number of employees. 
International Financial Intregation
De Jure
IMF’s Capital Account 
Liberalization Index
From the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restriction (AREAER). The index was constructed using data on controls to:
capital market securities; money market instruments; collective investment securities; derivatives and other instruments; commercial credits; financial credits;
guarantees, securities and financial backup facilities; direct investment; real estate transactions; personal capital transactions. For each indicator, a
corresponding dummy variable takes the value of one if the restrictions was present in each country. The index is the average over all indicators for each
country. 
De Facto  
Capital Inflows From the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Capital Inflows are the sum of the changes in the liabilities of FDI, equity portfolio, debt and derivative
flows. For FDI, we use direct investment in reporting economy (line 78bed). For portfolio equity investment, we use equity security liabilities (line 78bmd).
For derivative flows we used financial derivative liabilities (line 78bxd). For debt flows, we use debt security liabilities (line 78bnd) as well as other
investment liabilities (line 78bid).  Data is calculated as a percentage of GDP in U.S. dollars (taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators).  
Inflows of Foreign Direct 
Investment
From the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital. Data is reported as percentage of GDP.
Gross Capital Flows From the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Gross private capital flows to GDP are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other
investment inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities
and general government.
cont.
Data Appendix II: Variables
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
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Stock of Foreign 
Liabilities
From Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006). The authors estimate stocks of portfolio equity and foreign direct investment based on the IMF, IFS flow data. In order
to estimate FDI stocks, the authors cumulate flows and adjust for the effects of exchange rate changes. For portfolio equity stocks, they adjust for changes in
the end of year U.S. dollar value of the domestic stock market.  
Equity Flows
From the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Sum of Foreign Direct Investment inflows and portfolio equity investment inflows as a percentage of GDP. 
Net Capital Flows From the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Net capital flows are the sum of the changes in assets and liabilities on FDI, equity portfolio and debt. For
FDI, we use direct investment abroad (line 78bdd) and direct investment in reporting economy (line 78bed). For portfolio equity investment, we use equity
security assets (line 78bkd) and equity security liabilities (line 78bmd). For derivative flows we use financial derivative assets (line 78 bwd) and financial
derivative liabilities (line 78bxd). For debt flows, we use debt security assets (IFS line 78bld) and debt security liabilities (line 78bnd) as well as other
investment assets (line 78bhd) and other investment liabilities (line 78bid). Data is presented as a percentage of GDP.
Macroeconomic Data From the World Bank, World Development Indicators: (Log) GDP, (Log) GDP per capita, frowth real GDP, inflation (percent growth in the CPI), domestic
credit to GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP, inflation (change CPI), Trade (exports plus imports over GDP). From the Economist Intelligence Unit:
growth forecasts. Size of the informal sector as percentage of GDI in year 2000, from Schneider (2002).
Institutional Quality Fom the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk Services. Non-corruption (assessment of corruption within the
political system; average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk). Law and order (the law subcomponent is an assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system; the order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law; average yearly rating from 0 to 6,
where a higher score means lower risk). Bureaucratic quality (institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy; average yearly rating from 0 to 4, where a
higher score means lower risk.).
Regulation Form the World Bank, World Development Indicators: number of days required to start a business; business disclosure index (0=less disclosure to 7=more
disclosure); legal rights of borrowers and lenders index (0=less credit access to 10=more access).
Dependence on External 
Finance
Constructed by
37
r 1999-2003 following Rajan and Zingales (1998). An industry’s external financial dependence is obtained by calculating the
external financing of U.S. companies. Using data from Compustat, a firm's dependence on external finance is defined as: (Capex-Cashflow)/Capex, where
Capex is defined as capital expenditures and Cashflow is defined as cash flow from operations. Industries with negative external finance measures have cash
flows that are higher than their capital expenditures. 
Independent Variable (cont).
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Data Appendix III: Industry Codes
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) - 1987 Version
A. Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
    01: Agricultural Production Crops 
    02: Agriculture production livestock and animal specialties 
    07: Agricultural Services 
    08: Forestry 
    09: Fishing, hunting, and trapping 
B. Mining 
    10: Metal Mining  
    12: Coal Mining 
    13: Oil And Gas Extraction 
    14: Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 
C. Construction 
    15: Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 
    16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 
    17: Construction Special Trade Contractors 
D. Manufacturing 
    20: Food And Kindred Products 
    21: Tobacco Products 
    22: Textile Mill Products 
    23: Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 
    24: Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 
    25: Furniture And Fixtures 
    26: Paper And Allied Products 
    27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 
    28: Chemicals And Allied Products 
    29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 
    30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 
    31: Leather And Leather Products 
    32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 
    33: Primary Metal Industries 
    34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation Equipment 
    35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 
    36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment 
    37: Transportation Equipment 
    38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical 
Goods; Watches And Clocks 
    39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
E. Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services  
    40: Railroad Transportation 
    41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger Transportation 
    42: Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 
    43: United States Postal Service 
    44: Water Transportation 
    45: Transportation By Air 
    46: Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 
    47: Transportation Services 
    48: Communications 
    49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
F. Wholesale Trade 
    50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 
    51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 
cont.
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) - 1987 Version (cont.)
G.Retail Trade 
    52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home Dealers 
    53: General Merchandise Stores 
    54: Food Stores 
    55: Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 
    56: Apparel And Accessory Stores 
    57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 
    58: Eating And Drinking Places 
    59: Miscellaneous Retail 
H. Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate  
    60: Depository Institutions 
    61: Non-depository Credit Institutions 
    62: Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 
    63: Insurance Carriers 
    64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 
    65: Real Estate 
    67: Holding And Other Investment Offices 
I. Services 
    70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 
    72: Personal Services 
    73: Business Services 
    75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 
    76: Miscellaneous Repair Services 
    78: Motion Pictures 
    79: Amusement And Recreation Services 
    80: Health Services 
    81: Legal Services 
    82: Educational Services 
    83: Social Services 
    84: Museums, Art Galleries, And Botanical And Zoological Gardens 
    86: Membership Organizations 
    87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 
    88: Private Households 
    89: Miscellaneous Services 
J. Public Administration  
    91: Executive, Legislative, And General Government, Except Finance 
    92: Justice, Public Order, And Safety 
    93: Public Finance, Taxation, And Monetary Policy 
    94: Administration Of Human Resource Programs 
    95: Administration Of Environmental Quality And Housing Programs 
    96: Administration Of Economic Programs 
    97: National Security And International Affairs 
    99: Nonclassifiable Establishments 
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Country # Firms Empl.     Mean
Empl. 
Skewness
Age 
Mean Entry
% Foreign 
Firms
Algeria 1,182 575 12 14 3.1 0.6
Angola 195 748 9 16 5.1 23.1
Argentina 8,627 107 17 17 4.7 8.3
Australia 653,466 28 191 18 0.2 0.5
Austria 207,939 11 84 18 5.5 1.6
Belgium 639,073 7 697 16 6.1 0.8
Bolivia 563 80 4 16 4.5 7.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina 170 89 4 17 2.6 1.8
Brazil 263,090 46 89 18 0.3 0.8
Bulgaria 2,196 169 19 9 6.6 3.0
Burkina-Faso 87 583 9 16 2.9 10.3
Cameroon 125 242 5 20 2.8 11.2
Canada 597,993 11 163 19 2.8 1.2
Chile 3,218 161 10 17 5.1 6.2
China 78,237 408 114 13 4.6 5.5
Colombia 2,898 147 8 21 3.3 7.5
Costa Rica 1,332 354 35 19 4.8 5.3
Croatia 979 106 11 17 1.8 1.3
Czech Republic 1,697,489 67 13 11 2.0 0.2
Denmark 404,637 4 335 12 13.0 0.7
Dominican Republic 1,536 177 13 19 2.7 2.9
Ecuador 1,024 147 8 19 4.4 6.9
Egypt 2,198 552 13 20 2.3 3.6
El Salvador 664 173 6 19 3.3 6.2
Estonia 1,383 87 8 11 2.2 18.7
Ethiopia 132 926 4 22 2.3 1.5
Finland 267,694 3 91 15 7.2 0.8
France 4,024,287 3 1,053 12 11.9 1.1
Gabon 76 139 4 21 3.3 11.8
Gambia 26 142 3 16 5.8 0.0
Georgia 106 205 7 9 5.7 1.9
Germany 1,228,884 17 502 19 5.4 1.0
Ghana 521 189 10 16 3.4 2.9
Greece 27,883 33 60 16 3.1 0.3
Guatemala 679 139 13 15 4.0 5.2
Honduras 450 163 5 19 3.3 7.6
Hungary 66,585 41 95 12 1.6 2.3
India 9,682 637 88 20 1.8 2.1
Indonesia 682 688 10 18 2.1 9.2
Iran 1,226 476 10 19 4.0 0.2
Ireland 17,429 60 36 23 1.7 5.8
Israel 68,164 25 62 19 0.9 0.0
Italy 1,181,012 6 374 18 1.6 0.2
Jamaica 424 153 6 21 2.6 5.9
Japan 1,356,841 20 650 26 5.9 0.2
Jordan 734 119 9 15 5.4 0.3
Kenya 1,111 266 13 21 1.5 4.3
Korea South 156,168 14 144 5 19.9 0.1
Kuwait 922 337 8 20 4.6 0.5
Latvia 1,386 110 18 9 9.1 15.9
cont.
Table 1: Country Entrepreneurship Data: Summary Statistics  -- 2004
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Country # Firms Empl.     Mean
Empl. 
Skewness
Age 
Mean Entry
% Foreign 
Firms
Lebanon 921 72 7 14 7.4 0.8
Lithuania 1,248 155 16 12 3.6 5.7
Madagascar 124 591 8 20 3.2 6.5
Malaysia 23,118 102 31 17 1.7 3.9
Mauritius 358 253 4 21 2.2 0.3
Mexico 23,817 123 23 17 2.9 8.1
Morocco 2,295 202 17 20 4.4 4.2
Mozambique 159 616 9 17 3.1 18.2
Netherlands 1,042,095 8 184 13 12.5 1.2
New Zealand 50,541 20 58 18 1.9 2.7
Nicaragua 213 104 3 19 2.6 7.5
Nigeria 1,088 254 11 19 2.3 3.3
Norway 168,981 10 114 14 10.8 3.3
Oman 405 806 8 17 4.0 0.7
Panama 1,250 125 16 18 5.1 7.9
Papua New Guinea 102 386 4 26 0.5 19.6
Paraguay 411 118 9 18 3.9 7.1
Peru 7,746 77 10 14 6.8 2.4
Philippines 1,718 303 6 17 6.1 6.1
Poland 4,619 114 16 13 1.2 15.2
Portugal 488,633 5 103 13 7.2 0.5
Romania 3,877 244 25 10 9.5 15.3
Saudi Arabia 1,850 935 12 20 3.4 0.8
Senegal 237 176 6 21 4.4 3.0
Singapore 63,277 30 38 13 9.1 3.9
Slovakia 4,466 164 17 12 4.4 19.4
Slovenia 3,265 73 15 18 2.5 2.8
Spain 320,577 7 96 11 10.5 0.1
Sudan 135 1,275 11 20 4.8 2.2
Sweden 825,988 4 247 13 9.3 1.0
Switzerland 271,689 30 160 16 6.7 2.7
Syria 441 456 13 21 2.8 0.2
Tanzania 179 257 5 15 2.0 6.1
Thailand 1,471 443 8 16 2.9 5.8
Togo 59 160 4 20 3.4 6.8
Trinidad & Tobago 563 176 12 21 2.2 3.4
Tunisia 2,289 225 33 15 4.3 1.5
Turkey 10,467 761 10 11 11.6 4.0
Uganda 154 480 6 19 2.3 7.8
United Arab Emirates 5,407 674 13 12 9.2 6.9
United Kingdom 893,589 19 424 19 3.3 1.7
Uruguay 934 107 12 20 3.7 10.0
USA 7,389,228 9 2,351 18 6.1 0.2
Venezuela 2,134 130 7 22 2.4 7.8
Vietnam 114 1,073 10 10 7.5 1.8
Yemen 189 981 4 23 1.1 1.1
Zambia 112 1,215 10 19 4.9 14.3
Zimbabwe 98 375 4 26 4.6 4.1
 
Table 1: Country Entrepreneurship Data: Summary Statistics  -- 2004 (Continued )
Notes: Summary statistics correspond to D&B Data Set of 24 million firms for 2004. Counts do not consider SIC 9
(public sector) and industry 43. Entry corresponds to the percentage of new firms. See Data Appendix for detailed data
description. 
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SIC # Firms  Sales Mean (U.S.$) 
Employ.  
Mean
Employ. 
Skew.
Age 
Mean Entry
% Foreign 
Firms SIC # Firms
 Sales Mean 
(U.S.$) 
Sales 
Skew. 
Employ. 
Mean
Employ. 
Skew.
Age 
Mean Entry
% Foreign 
Firms
01 713,580     371,031         3            435        20      3.26 0.02 46 3,402          112,349,111    17       59           7             14        2.59 0.38
02 428,394     354,196         2            105        20      3.95 0.01 47 213,269      4,307,284        90       14           92           13        7.11 1.13
07 295,844     526,947         5            120        15      6.90 0.03 48 79,048        20,836,546      81       49           158         10        12.26 0.98
08 128,309     431,695         3            178        11      8.96 0.04 49 94,020        26,437,706      65       52           59           17        6.38 0.86
09 27,370       1,070,338      8            53          16      5.41 0.15 50 1,145,973   6,793,763        823     14           465         16        6.02 1.26
10 6,630         36,115,356    176        28          17      2.29 1.61 51 939,051      8,613,254        220     15           453         16        4.83 0.69
12 2,219         37,816,832    768        12          20      2.66 1.01 52 181,317      1,855,490        255     7             252         19        4.41 0.17
13 22,876       54,532,790    106        88          19      4.08 1.29 53 59,883        25,936,266      179     34           112         15        8.78 0.22
14 19,904       7,361,145      34          121        22      4.09 1.45 54 510,605      3,017,759        136     9             418         15        6.84 0.25
15 696,335     1,901,223      8            650        18      6.40 0.05 55 393,621      4,342,818        131     10           366         19        4.98 0.32
16 206,270     4,971,769      23          267        24      4.32 0.22 56 394,170      1,116,349        242     5             126         16        7.75 0.29
17 1,765,406  137,907,664  6            473        17      6.50 0.07 57 406,919      1,608,978        444     6             271         18        6.13 0.26
20 208,737     12,668,835    40          126        19      6.12 0.62 58 987,537      661,171           241     8             176         13        8.33 0.19
21 1,009         129,953,155  380        11          21      5.15 6.10 59 1,284,587   431,245,780    728     4             830         15        7.55 0.23
22 70,833       4,910,092      68          37          20      3.65 0.57 60 60,375        54,469,078      132     85           43           26        5.39 1.85
23 127,738     2,907,002      32          48          16      5.00 0.22 61 82,477        12,645,087      142     18           176         12        9.52 0.84
24 165,074     3,159,681      16          162        17      3.54 0.16 62 101,485      7,669,455        112     19           146         12        13.15 0.69
25 93,738       2,704,394      18          42          18      4.45 0.30 63 44,338        438,666,659    169     99           78           20        5.69 1.86
26 30,691       21,072,167    74          45          22      3.66 2.08 64 217,775      2,285,519        367     7             210         17        5.24 0.24
27 240,919     3,598,782      18          453        18      5.85 0.36 65 1,147,555   1,103,200        515     5             822         16        9.93 0.21
28 72,077       29,874,511    89          60          19      5.48 3.31 67 556,167      13,814,174      258     35           205         14        8.91 0.65
29 5,344         188,566,761  320        66          20      4.02 2.78 70 237,768      1,444,980        116     15           148         17        5.12 0.24
30 72,595       9,534,537      57          55          20      3.51 1.81 72 897,896      325,497           263     4             177         14        7.19 0.07
31 29,394       3,203,448      49          24          19      3.41 0.55 73 1,878,877   4,724,003        1,175  11           236         11        9.22 0.47
32 91,907       6,933,111      39          91          20      4.41 1.29 75 503,720      778,447           289     5             219         17        4.78 0.21
33 46,587       24,965,634    120        49          20      4.03 1.65 76 317,479      578,566           348     5             314         16        6.14 0.16
34 279,551     4,085,868      24          82          19      3.48 0.55 78 112,650      1,455,396        177     6             123         12        9.10 0.21
35 227,043     9,654,378      38          75          20      4.65 1.42 79 576,247      1,212,539        332     10           667         14        9.34 0.04
36 150,398     40,090,440    84          42          16      5.32 1.66 80 866,390      1,617,395        314     16           82           16        5.42 0.03
37 56,890       65,109,353    103        61          19      5.75 1.93 81 244,511      597,825           298     6             162         18        4.09 0.02
38 72,627       9,876,270      40          241        17      5.50 1.54 82 310,302      2,755,343        175     27           111         19        6.43 0.06
39 130,857     2,160,329      16          59          16      5.54 0.32 83 318,884      911,584           84       16           161         17        5.71 0.03
40 1,894         96,294,822    417        19          19      5.86 2.11 84 18,920        907,950           18       10           23           21        5.26 0.06
41 150,949     1,710,587      31          349        15      6.71 0.23 86 627,854      1,017,928        275     8             387         24        4.08 0.01
42 372,994     2,402,695      12          287        16      6.34 0.29 87 1,571,535   1,530,838        419     8             284         12        8.43 0.30
44 35,435       8,918,267      29          89          18      6.34 0.88 88 3,757          392,338           23       2             31           6          22.85 0.00
45 18,339       41,512,170    94          50          15      5.27 1.70 89 131,361      771,817           79       8             182         12        10.67 0.18
Notes: Notes: Summary statistics correspond to D&B Data Set of 24 million firms for 2004. Counts do not consider SIC 9 (public sector) and industry 43. Entry corresponds to the percentage of new firms. See Data
Appendix for detailed data description.
Table 2: Industry Entrepreneurship Data Summary Statistics -- 2004
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De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI   
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
Net Capital 
Flows/GDP
Algeria 0.917 1.042 36.185
Angola 0.846 6.983 7.409 138.803 25.735 -3.236
Argentina 0.615 -5.034 2.669 135.792 15.634 -12.983
Australia 0.769 11.092 6.664 145.651 32.016 8.592
Austria 0.308 20.562 1.376 205.214 41.900 -0.775
Belgium 0.154 37.291 11.376 394.311 73.485 -7.038
Bolivia 0.308 3.470 1.328 133.344 5.029 3.706
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.462 7.181 82.474 21.790
Brazil 0.538 1.432 3.008 77.587 8.788 -1.334
Bulgaria 0.462 17.730 8.310 110.525 29.591 12.081
Burkina-Faso 1.000 0.726 40.715
Cameroon 0.923 0.002 56.257
Canada 0.154 4.376 0.643 111.613 13.984 0.465
Chile 0.462 7.165 8.079 118.219 21.499 -6.122
China 0.923 5.387 2.844 47.403 9.985 6.751
Colombia 0.846 4.499 3.123 70.749 10.887 2.755
Costa Rica 0.000 4.475 3.350 68.744 12.316 3.976
Croatia 0.846 14.072 3.622 126.210 20.844 9.534
Czech Republic 0.385 11.785 4.162 98.606 19.622 8.884
Denmark 0.154 2.003 -3.647 207.762 37.962 -13.973
Dominican Republic 0.615 3.603 3.455 88.038 13.521 1.188
Ecuador 0.231 6.177 3.832 99.613 13.081 1.059
Egypt 0.462 1.602 1.591 77.683 13.258 -5.358
El Salvador 0.231 4.497 2.944 97.246 12.461 4.590
Estonia 0.308 28.934 9.330 194.070 51.933 21.678
Ethiopia 0.846 4.185 6.811 109.375 3.987 0.914
Finland 0.385 12.853 1.654 207.551 42.103 -12.821
France 0.154 19.763 1.198 206.368 26.102 -3.513
Gabon 1.000  4.465 66.398
Gambia 0.154 14.455
Georgia 0.167 10.138 9.595 93.503 12.359 8.958
Germany 0.077 6.444 -1.274 159.067 27.421 -4.765
Ghana 0.769 4.246 1.570 131.620 6.783 2.273
Greece 0.231 14.211 0.660 140.271 32.346 11.842
Guatemala 0.231 4.498 0.564 39.418 11.564 7.092
Honduras 0.615 9.382 3.975 115.248 7.986 9.764
Hungary 0.154 11.120 4.576 138.969 24.692 18.807
India 1.000 0.772 34.320
Indonesia 0.846 1.163 0.397 76.452 4.564 2.414
Iran 1.000 0.306 12.325
Ireland 0.154 134.261 6.079 949.880 314.072 -2.871
Israel 0.154 5.049 1.424 116.012 18.682 -3.192
Italy 0.154 6.432 1.000 123.625 10.430 2.403
Jamaica 0.417 28.593 6.786 146.729 45.506 14.784
Japan 0.154 4.733 0.169 50.989 14.374 0.983
Jordan 0.231 4.950 5.387 105.826 18.125 -5.595
Kenya 0.462 2.636 0.286 51.437 7.249 -0.166
Korea South 0.846 4.347 1.205 56.600 8.546 2.620
Kuwait 0.538 -0.018 -0.037 25.267 35.804 -60.182
Latvia 0.308 28.552 5.149 122.556 43.069 16.238
cont.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Capital Mobility -- 2004
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De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI    
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
Net Capital 
Flows/GDP
Lebanon 0.615 31.954 1.323 243.293 32.373
Lithuania 0.385 10.095 3.473 71.972 19.420 6.075
Madagascar 1.000 1.031 119.808
Malaysia 0.923 16.061 3.908 113.051 10.630
Mauritius 0.308 2.360 0.230 34.480 6.460 -0.466
Mexico 0.769 2.889 2.569 63.368 6.897 3.158
Morocco 0.846 1.087 1.537 80.127 7.558 1.282
Mozambique 1.000 1.110 4.021 108.767 7.919 -1.181
Netherlands 0.077 -6.413 0.065 408.345 66.604 -14.714
New Zealand 0.154 10.038 2.296 154.822 15.448 15.352
Nicaragua 0.231 1.570 5.489 132.920 6.088 1.339
Nigeria 1.000 0.000 0.000
Norway 0.385 15.223 0.201 140.781 31.751 -19.622
Oman 0.333 6.836 -0.070 32.373 8.615 5.217
Panama 0.000 18.218 7.369 207.828 39.017 4.210
Papua New Guinea 1.000 0.651 128.898
Paraguay 0.077 1.737 1.259 63.630 3.433 1.538
Peru 0.154 4.061 2.646 83.622 6.769 4.654
Philippines 0.923 1.075 0.555 97.969 13.703 -5.444
Poland 0.769 9.219 5.206 84.914 18.084 7.263
Portugal 0.385 15.907 0.492 245.704 37.566 6.307
Romania 0.385 15.857 7.435 65.314 14.225 13.982
Saudi Arabia 0.769 0.472 25.072 19.964 -29.567
Senegal 1.000 0.900 75.584
Singapore 0.385 44.971 15.009 424.184 116.893 -22.673
Slovakia 0.231 0.000 2.731 97.037
Slovenia 0.538 11.440 2.570 84.430 22.407 -0.154
Spain 0.154 18.345 1.596 174.532 30.793 13.366
Sudan 0.818 3.835 7.162 113.067 10.398 6.862
Sweden 0.462 -1.560 -0.170 222.986 44.801 -17.271
Switzerland 0.154 9.462 -0.223 421.277 54.774 -29.122
Syria 1.000 -0.250 1.145 142.015 1.561 -0.250
Tanzania 1.000 2.111 2.296 97.850 3.508 2.013
Thailand 0.846 0.196 0.873 74.153 7.945 0.945
Togo 1.000 2.911 131.259
Trinidad & Tobago 0.308 7.983 108.609
Tunisia 0.923 6.176 2.105 134.442 6.583 5.253
Turkey 0.769 8.797 0.903 72.875 12.838 8.277
Uganda 0.154 4.660 3.254 94.938 4.819 4.411
United Arab Emirates 0.385 20.581
United Kingdom 0.154 46.156 3.416 373.679 91.744 -3.410
Uruguay 0.154 6.848 2.352 154.671 22.043 -3.353
USA 0.308 12.296 0.912 106.661 20.043 10.606
Venezuela 0.027 1.379 72.272 16.213 -9.681
Vietnam 1.000 6.131 3.561 85.403 6.209
Yemen 0.308 -0.287 1.119 49.923 1.563 -0.585
Zambia 0.077 6.183 134.320
Zimbabwe 1.000 1.278
Notes: The IMF index is the average of control to: capital market securities; money market instruments; collective investment securities; derivatives and other
instruments; commercial credits; financial credits; guarantees, securities and financial backup facilities; direct investment; real estate transactions; and personal capital 
transactions, from IMF, AREAER. Total Capital Inflows/GDP are the sum of inflows of foreign direct investment, portfolio, derivatives and debt flows, from IMF,
IFS. FDI Inflows/GDP are foreign direct investment flows, net from WB, WDI. Gross Capital Flows/GDP are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and
other investment inflows and outflows excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government from WB, WDI. Net Capital
Flows are the sum of the inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment, portfolio, derivatives and debt flows, from IMF, IFS. Foreign Liabilities/GDP from Lane-
Milesi Ferreti.  See Data Appendix for detailed data description.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Capital Mobility -- 2004 (Continued)
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Country Bureau. Qual.
Non-
Corrup.
Law 
and 
Order
Days to 
Start 
Business
Country Bureau. Qual.
Non-
Corrup.
Law and 
Order
Days to 
Start 
Business
Algeria 2.00 1.50 2.00 26 Latvia 2.50 2.00 5.00 18
Angola 1.00 2.00 3.00 146 Lebanon 2.00 1.00 4.00 46
Argentina 3.00 2.50 1.50 32 Lithuania 2.50 2.50 4.00 26
Australia 4.00 4.50 6.00 2 Madagascar 1.00 4.00 2.50 44
Austria 4.00 5.00 6.00 29 Malaysia 3.00 2.50 3.00 30
Belgium 4.00 4.00 5.00 34 Mexico 3.00 2.00 2.00 58
Bolivia 2.00 2.00 3.00 59 Morocco 2.00 3.00 5.00 11
Bosnia-Herzeg.  54 Mozambique 1.00 1.50 3.00 153
Brazil 2.00 4.00 1.50 152 Netherlands 4.00 5.00 6.00 11
Bulgaria 2.00 2.00 4.00 32 New Zealand 4.00 5.50 6.00 12
Burkina-Faso 1.00 2.00 3.50 135 Nicaragua 1.00 2.50 4.00 45
Cameroon 1.00 2.00 2.00 37 Nigeria 1.00 1.00 1.50 44
Canada 4.00 5.00 6.00 3 Norway 4.00 5.00 6.00 23
Chile 3.00 2.50 5.00 27 Oman 2.00 2.50 5.00 34
China 2.00 2.00 4.50 41 Panama 2.00 2.00 3.00 19
Colombia 2.00 3.00 1.00 43 Papua New Guinea 2.00 1.00 2.00 56
Costa Rica 2.00 2.50 4.00 77 Paraguay 1.00 1.00 2.00 74
Croatia 3.00 3.00 5.00 49 Peru 2.00 2.50 3.00 98
Czech Republic 3.00 2.50 5.00 40 Philippines 3.00 2.00 2.00 50
Denmark 4.00 5.50 6.00 4 Poland 3.00 2.00 4.00 31
Dominican Rep. 1.00 2.00 2.00 78 Portugal 3.00 3.50 5.00 78
Ecuador 2.00 3.00 3.00 92 Romania 1.00 2.50 4.00 28
Egypt 2.00 1.50 4.00 43 Saudi Arabia 2.00 2.00 5.00 64
El Salvador 2.00 2.50 2.50 115 Senegal 1.00 2.50 3.00 57
Estonia 2.50 3.00 4.00 72 Singapore 4.00 4.50 5.00 8
Ethiopia 1.00 2.00 5.00 32 Slovakia 3.00 2.50 4.00 52
Finland 4.00 6.00 6.00 14 Slovenia 3.00 3.00 4.50 61
France 3.00 3.00 5.00 8 Spain 4.00 3.50 4.50 108
Gabon 2.00 1.00 3.00 Sudan 1.00 1.00 2.50
Gambia 2.00 3.00 4.00 Sweden 4.00 5.00 6.00 16
Georgia  25 Switzerland 4.00 4.50 5.00 20
Germany 4.00 4.50 5.00 45 Syria 1.00 2.00 5.00 47
Ghana 2.00 2.50 2.00 85 Tanzania 1.00 2.00 5.00 35
Greece 3.00 2.50 3.00 38 Thailand 2.00 1.50 2.50 33
Guatemala 2.00 1.50 1.50 39 Togo 0.00 1.50 3.00 53
Honduras 2.00 2.50 1.50 62 Trinidad & Tobago 3.00 2.00 2.00
Hungary 4.00 3.00 4.00 Tunisia 2.00 2.00 5.00 14
India 3.00 1.50 4.00 89 Turkey 2.00 2.50 4.50 9
Indonesia 2.00 1.00 2.00 151 Uganda 2.00 2.00 4.00 36
Iran 2.00 2.00 4.00 48 UAE 3.00 2.00 4.00 54
Ireland 4.00 3.50 6.00 24 United Kingdom 4.00 4.50 6.00 18
Israel 4.00 4.00 5.00 34 Uruguay 2.00 3.00 2.50 45
Italy 2.50 2.50 3.00 13 USA 4.00 4.00 5.00 5
Jamaica 3.00 1.50 1.00 31 Venezuela 1.00 1.50 1.00
Japan 4.00 3.50 5.00 31 Vietnam 2.00 1.50 4.00 56
Jordan 2.00 3.00 4.00 36 Yemen 1.00 2.00 2.00 63
Kenya 2.00 3.50 2.00 Zambia 1.00 2.00 4.00 35
Korea South 0.00 1.00 5.00 22 Zimbabwe 2.00 0.00 0.50 96
Kuwait 2.00 2.00 5.00 35
Notes: Days to start a business data are from World Bank, World Development Indicators. The indices of Bureaucratic Quality (institutional strength and
quality of the bureaucracy, 0-6) Non-Corruption index (assessment of corruption within the political system, 0-6), Law and Order (law: assessment of the
strength and impartiality of the legal system; order: assessment of the popular observance of the law; 0-6) from the International Country Risk Guide, PRS
Group. See Data Appendix for detailed data description.
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Entry Age Empl. Skew. Empl. IMF Index
FDI 
Inflows
Gross 
Capital 
Flows
Capital 
Inflows
Foreign 
Liabilities
Net 
Capital 
Flows
Log   
GDP
Log 
GDPpc
GDP 
Growth
Days to 
Start 
Business
Bureau. 
Qual.
Non-
Corrup.
Law and 
Order
Entry 1.0000
Age -0.4185 1.0000
Empl. -0.1764 0.2184 1.0000
Skew. Empl. 0.0791 -0.0400 -0.4111 1.0000
IMF Index -0.0863 -0.0177 0.4191 -0.2326 1.0000
FDI Inflows/GDP -0.0574 -0.1044 0.1143 -0.1183 0.0393 1.0000
Gross Capital Flows/GDP -0.0034 0.0613 -0.1939 0.1235 -0.3083 0.3083 1.0000
Capital Inflows/GDP -0.0425 0.0399 -0.1348 0.1108 -0.2837 0.4168 0.9296 1.0000
Foreign Liabilities/GDP 0.0369 0.0520 -0.3018 0.1912 -0.3675 0.2491 0.9391 0.8335 1.0000
Net Capital Flows/GDP -0.1262 -0.0919 0.1610 -0.0839 0.0636 0.1847 -0.2140 0.0287 -0.2719 1.0000
Log GDP 0.0599 0.0760 -0.3461 0.4772 -0.1722 -0.2725 0.1611 0.1199 0.2053 -0.1664 1.0000
Log GDPpc 0.1186 0.0167 -0.5537 0.4087 -0.5352 -0.1058 0.4395 0.3555 0.4820 -0.3192 0.6460 1.0000
GDP Growth -0.0086 -0.0798 0.4230 -0.2874 0.3760 0.3848 -0.0769 -0.0357 -0.1926 0.0572 -0.3105 -0.4430 1.0000
Days to Start Business -0.1168 0.0255 0.2111 -0.2129 0.1591 0.0004 -0.2398 -0.1910 -0.2579 0.1901 -0.2601 -0.4660 0.0967 1.0000
Bureaucratic Quality 0.0581 0.0306 -0.5320 0.3706 -0.4326 -0.0826 0.4424 0.3542 0.5090 -0.2125 0.6024 0.8564 -0.4400 -0.4265 1.0000
Non-Corruption 0.1078 0.0244 -0.5526 0.3511 -0.4292 -0.1460 0.3247 0.2105 0.4341 -0.3067 0.4532 0.7413 -0.3976 -0.3608 0.7849 1.0000
Law and Order 0.1484 -0.0511 -0.3808 0.2941 -0.3165 -0.0318 0.4053 0.3523 0.4472 -0.2135 0.3696 0.6758 -0.2472 -0.5416 0.6484 0.6793 1.0000
Notes:  See Data Appendix for detailed data description.
Table 5: Correlation Table for Main Variables
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI    
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Mobility -5.995 0.026 0.145 0.027 0.204
[0.586]*** [0.010]*** [0.046]*** [0.002]*** [0.008]***
Log GDP -0.384 0.434 0.798 0.582 0.975
[0.079]*** [0.086]*** [0.113]*** [0.083]*** [0.085]***
Log GDP per capita 8.318 6.902 1.533 4.591 7.177
[0.345]*** [0.378]*** [0.202]*** [0.305]*** [0.330]***
GDP Growth 0.843 0.052 0.101 0.875 0.649
[0.090]*** [0.082] [0.058]* [0.069]*** [0.076]***
Days to Start Business 0.069 0.086 -0.008 0.081 0.090
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005] [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Bureaucratic Quality -7.992 -8.658 -1.224 -1.222 -8.950
[0.313]*** [0.306]*** [0.286]*** [0.354]*** [0.289]***
Non-Corruption -0.066 0.261 0.333 -1.800 -0.976
[0.142] [0.150]* [0.193]* [0.123]*** [0.134]***
Law and Order 3.201 5.136 0.781 1.823 4.377
[0.152]*** [0.162]*** [0.146]*** [0.187]*** [0.159]***
Constant -60.200 -76.968 -34.843 -66.604 -92.411
[2.612]*** [2.581]*** [2.742]*** [2.538]*** [2.394]***
# Observations 5736 4873 5680 4568 4531
Table 6a: Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility I -- Cross Section 2004 (Tobit/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Entry 
Capital Mobility measured as
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated using Tobit. Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%,
**5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship
measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the number of new firms relative to all firms in the country/industry pair. The capital
mobility variables correspond to IMF index in (1); Capital Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and
Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5). GDP data and Days to Start a Business come from WB, WDI. Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and
Law and Order from ICRG. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the data.
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI     
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Mobility 0.518 -0.064 -0.006 -0.010 -0.020
[0.232]** [0.019]*** [0.055] [0.004]*** [0.009]**
Log GDP 0.001 -0.037 0.124 -0.041 -0.020
[0.054] [0.057] [0.110] [0.075] [0.094]
Log GDP per capita -0.102 -0.571 -1.835 -1.133 -1.777
[0.103] [0.187]*** [0.464]*** [0.339]*** [0.418]***
GDP Growth 0.143 0.104 0.048 -0.042 -0.011
[0.030]*** [0.050]** [0.083] [0.093] [0.073]
Days to Start Business 0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.007
[0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007]
Bureaucratic Quality -0.027 0.462 1.557 0.496 1.878
[0.131] [0.251]* [0.434]*** [0.224]** [0.380]***
Non-Corruption -0.467 -0.537 -0.317 -0.002 -0.297
[0.083]*** [0.134]*** [0.242] [0.205] [0.208]
Law and Order 0.020 0.203 -0.060 0.262 -0.213
[0.066] [0.101]** [0.196] [0.127]** [0.175]
Constant 5.488 8.135 12.018 12.679 15.739
[1.083]*** [1.378]*** [3.754]*** [2.874]*** [3.162]***
# Observations 5625 4644 5570 4470 4445
R2 0.48 0.67 0.69 0.81 0.75
Table 6b: Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility II -- Cross Section 2004 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Size (Log of  Employment)
Capital Mobility measured as
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity and corrected at
the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are
weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the
log of the average number of employees in the country/industry pair. The capital mobility variables correspond to IMF index in (1); Capital
Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5). GDP data and Days to
Start a Business come from WB, WDI. Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See Data Appendix for
detailed description of the data.
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI    
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Mobility -8.816 0.234 3.200 0.053 0.188
[2.823]*** [0.063]*** [1.402]** [0.015]*** [0.034]***
Log GDP 6.272 6.269 16.706 4.212 5.517
[1.035]*** [1.026]*** [2.597]*** [0.491]*** [0.680]***
Log GDP per capita -0.618 0.902 17.659 0.694 0.244
[0.944] [1.146] [13.310] [0.506] [1.189]
GDP Growth -1.463 -1.229 -4.586 -0.670 -0.993
[0.293]*** [0.380]*** [2.388]* [0.209]*** [0.332]***
Days to Start Business -0.064 -0.040 -0.214 -0.017 -0.034
[0.030]** [0.030] [0.221] [0.015] [0.026]
Bureaucratic Quality -2.389 -3.439 -39.851 -2.089 -2.788
[1.194]** [1.575]** [10.374]*** [0.894]** [1.541]*
Non-Corruption 2.999 3.540 9.400 2.655 3.475
[0.804]*** [1.008]*** [8.135] [0.638]*** [0.795]***
Law and Order 0.531 0.017 2.599 0.202 -0.187
[0.699] [0.858] [5.699] [0.483] [0.803]
Constant -155.393 -172.594 -533.944 -126.786 -146.258
[21.968]*** [23.831]*** [115.863]*** [13.154]*** [17.901]***
# Observations 4597 4238 4547 3554 3976
R2 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.52 0.46
Table 6c:  Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility III -- Cross Section 2004 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Skewness of Employment
Capital Mobility measured as
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity and corrected at
the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are
weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the
skewness of the employment distribution. The capital mobility variables correspond to IMF index in (1); Capital Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI
Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5). GDP data and Days to Start a Business come from
WB, WDI. Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the data.
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI     
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D Capital Mobility 1.185 0.147 0.090 0.002 0.086
[0.587]** [0.057]** [0.021]*** [0.008] [0.026]***
D Log GDP -3.689 45.806 -9.793 22.406 -52.345
[9.601] [28.692] [17.930] [9.128]** [24.791]**
D Log GDP per capita -10.159 -56.341 9.573 -21.023 49.124
[10.467] [25.822]** [17.953] [8.215]** [24.070]**
D GDP Growth 0.266 -0.245 -0.343 -0.083 -0.728
[0.222] [0.153] [0.469] [0.111] [0.407]*
D Bureaucratic Quality -0.077 -0.281 -0.086 -1.245 -2.524
[0.605] [1.758] [4.252] [0.640]* [5.301]
D Law and Order 0.152 -1.786 -2.715 -0.396 -3.434
[0.180] [0.741]** [1.404]* [0.430] [0.791]***
D Non-Corruption 0.313 0.360 -1.174 -0.158 -1.926
[0.413] [0.785] [1.817] [0.492] [1.936]
Constant -0.134 -5.692 -0.838 -1.799 0.231
[0.789] [4.059] [0.900] [1.120] [1.154]
# Observations 2910 2580 3009 3616 2596
R2 0.26 0.08 0.32 0.06 0.36
Table 7a: Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility III -- Differences in Differences 2004-1999 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Difference in Entry
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity.with White's
correction of heteroskedasticity and corrected at the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%,
**5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship
measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the number of new firms relative to all firms in the country/industry pair. The capital
mobility variables correspond to IMF index in (1); Capital Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and
Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5). GDP data and Days to Start a Business come from WB, WDI. Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and
Law and Order from ICRG. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the data.
Capital Mobility measured as
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI     
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D Capital Mobility 7.039 0.661 0.586 0.256 0.653
[3.786]* [0.346]* [0.290]** [0.118]** [0.197]***
D Log GDP -55.415 -432.685 71.320 424.433 -459.390
[72.300] [216.790]* [123.786] [108.562]*** [147.251]***
D Log GDP per capita 44.663 453.169 -90.924 -588.679 383.610
[76.852] [173.589]** [125.799] [137.700]*** [155.676]**
D GDP Growth -1.044 -1.574 5.730 0.481 -7.351
[1.333] [2.923] [2.447]** [1.593] [2.644]***
D Bureaucratic Quality 9.329 8.108 -4.360 -9.499 -6.545
[5.810] [8.577] [14.808] [11.728] [8.844]
D Law and Order -3.176 17.567 -5.006 9.376 -22.759
[1.542]** [4.824]*** [7.860] [5.923] [6.560]***
D Non-Corruption 0.352 2.619 9.176 -19.782 10.896
[2.034] [4.853] [5.553] [8.912]** [5.895]*
Constant 18.536 -50.492 -278.189 -51.147 51.156
[1.605]*** [19.311]** [63.097]*** [14.463]*** [7.166]***
# Observations 2104 1927 1452 1921 1817
R2 0.360 0.420 0.550 0.320 0.510
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity.with White's
correction of heteroskedasticity and corrected at the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%,
**5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship
measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the skewness of the employment distribution. The capital mobility variables correspond to
IMF index in (1); Capital Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5).
GDP data and Days to Start a Business come from WB, WDI. Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See
Data Appendix for detailed description of the data.
Table 7b: Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility III -- Differences in Differences 2004-1999 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Skewness of Employment
Capital Mobility measured as
5149
Same Industry Upstream Industries
Downstream 
Industries Same Industry
Upstream 
Industries
Downstream 
Industries
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign Firms 1.805 68.773 242.920 1.029 83.090 161.822
[0.373]*** [57.957] [74.639]*** [0.001]*** [2.578]*** [2.047]***
Log GDP 1.396 1.360 1.843 0.021 -0.001 -0.009
[0.596]** [0.684]** [0.727]** [0.002]*** [0.028] [0.019]
Log GDP per capita -23.729 -24.319 -27.242 0.006 0.004 0.005
[2.306]*** [2.623]*** [2.752]*** [0.009] [0.108] [0.070]
GDP Growth -5.990 -6.509 -6.661 0.004 -0.123 -0.113
[0.616]*** [0.707]*** [0.757]*** [0.002]* [0.030]*** [0.020]***
Days to Start Business -0.218 -0.241 -0.298 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
[0.033]*** [0.038]*** [0.040]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]* [0.001]***
Bureaucratic Quality -17.472 -17.215 -17.317 -0.022 -0.448 -0.147
[1.721]*** [2.041]*** [2.129]*** [0.007]*** [0.087]*** [0.057]***
Non-Corruption 18.531 18.061 18.943 0.002 0.250 0.019
[1.081]*** [1.364]*** [1.441]*** [0.004] [0.060]*** [0.040]
Law and Order 9.863 11.094 10.341 0.077 0.402 0.215
[1.037]*** [1.217]*** [1.265]*** [0.004]*** [0.053]*** [0.034]***
Constant 74.074 77.056 95.226 -1.068 -1.799 -0.544
[17.176]*** [19.522]*** [20.397]*** [0.072]*** [0.883]** [0.568]
# Observations 4899 3886 3597 5108 4051 3618
R2 0.39 0.38 0.44
Table 8: Channels  -- FDI:
Entrepreneurial Activity in
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS in columns (1)-(3) and Tobit in columns (4)-(6) with White's correction for
heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the number
of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the skewness of the employment
distribution of domestic firms; in columns (4)-(6) entry of new domestic firms. Foreign firms are the share of foreign firms to total firms. GDP data and
Days to Start a Business are from WB, WDI, Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See the Data Appendix for a detailed
description of the data. 
Effects of Foreign Firms' Activity on Same, Upstream, and Downstream Industries 2004 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Domestic Entrepreneurship
Domestic Skewness (OLS) Domestic Entry (Tobit)
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 De Jure De Facto De Facto De Facto De Facto
IMF Index Capital Inflows/GDP
FDI 
Inflows/GDP
Foreign 
Liabilities/GDP
Gross Capital 
Flows/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Capital Mobility 10.714 0.053 0.470 0.001 2.082
[0.142]*** [0.000]*** [0.010]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]***
High External Finance -21.152 0.004 8.531 11.223 0.431
Dep. x Capital Mobility [0.176]*** [0.000]*** [0.018]*** [0.025]*** [0.003]***
Log GDP 13.798 9.962 20.078 12.890 25.535
[0.016]*** [0.004]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.022]***
Log GDP per capita 18.552 -1.174 15.007 37.749 -12.992
[0.069]*** [0.012]*** [0.074]*** [0.082]*** [0.092]***
GDP Growth -2.395 -1.484 -2.183 -0.733 -3.981
[0.018]*** [0.002]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.019]***
Days to Start Business -0.232 -0.140 -0.241 0.050 -0.507
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Bureaucratic Quality -33.915 -5.057 -46.485 -25.907 -28.824
[0.063]*** [0.013]*** [0.069]*** [0.066]*** [0.080]***
Non-Corruption 5.661 4.829 11.600 -6.467 3.440
[0.028]*** [0.008]*** [0.029]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]***
Law and Order 1.848 -1.571 6.139 -0.273 -5.323
[0.030]*** [0.007]*** [0.034]*** [0.034]*** [0.045]***
Constant -463.979 -242.506 -598.805 -619.569 -489.415
[1.493]*** [0.111]*** [2.140]*** [2.604]*** [2.250]***
# Observations 2158 1939 1813 2041 1531
R2 0.40 0.43 0.52 0.41 0.42
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction for heteroskedasticity and corrected at
the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are
weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the
skewness of the employment distribution. The capital mobility variables correspond to the IMF index in (1); Capital Inflows/GDP in (2); FDI
Inflows/GDP in (3); Foreign Liabilities/GDP in (4); and Gross Capital Flows/GDP in (5). GDP data and Days to Start a Business are from
WB, WDI, Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See the Data Appendix for a detailed description of the
data.
Table 9: Channels -- Financial Dependence 2004  (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Skewness of Employment
Capital Mobility Measured as
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Dependent Variable Entry Size Skewness Entry Skewness Entry Skewness Skewness Skewness
Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Entry Size Skew Entry: Entry: Macro Skewness:
54
Skewness: Skewness:
IMF Index -1.264 0.567 -4.673 -1.233 -9.049 -2.394 -8.294 -11.014 -9.496
[0.620]** [0.287]* [2.117]** [0.381]*** [2.953]*** [0.774]*** [3.285]** [2.668]*** [2.993]***
Log GDP 0.394 0.050 4.790 0.140 6.386 0.856 5.978 5.698 6.596
[0.121]*** [0.063] [0.436]*** [0.072]* [1.052]*** [0.150]*** [0.745]*** [0.754]*** [1.052]***
Log GDP per capita 1.400 -0.272 0.265 0.520 -0.865 1.653 -0.780 -0.937 -0.862
[0.263]*** [0.135]** [0.894] [0.143]*** [1.038] [0.290]*** [1.110] [0.888] [1.038]
GDP Growth 0.168 0.132 -1.247 0.133 -1.462 0.440 -1.722 -1.455 -1.643
[0.067]** [0.033]*** [0.263]*** [0.045]*** [0.352]*** [0.086]*** [0.381]*** [0.297]*** [0.287]***
Days to Start Business -0.011 -0.001 -0.019 -0.009 -0.067 -0.035 -0.064 -0.047 -0.082
[0.006]** [0.003] [0.015] [0.003]*** [0.029]** [0.007]*** [0.028]** [0.025]* [0.031]**
Bureaucratic Quality -1.233 0.123 -3.826 -1.209 -2.390 -1.097 -3.402 -2.388 -2.278
[0.379]*** [0.179] [1.132]*** [0.189]*** [1.261]* [0.333]*** [1.281]*** [1.251]* [1.165]*
Non-Corruption 0.443 -0.377 2.417 0.309 3.227 -0.091 2.873 3.145 2.807
[0.197]** [0.108]*** [0.634]*** [0.127]** [0.860]*** [0.227] [0.858]*** [0.737]*** [0.823]***
Law and Order 0.615 0.033 0.386 0.477 0.622 0.314 -0.374 0.898 0.563
[0.150]*** [0.080] [0.509] [0.093]*** [0.720] [0.205] [0.962] [0.603] [0.740]
Rights Borrowers/Lenders -0.220 0.021 0.886
[0.079]*** [0.042] [0.276]***
Business Disclosure Index -0.072 -0.046 -0.001
[0.110] [0.056] [0.350]
Domestic Credit/GDP -0.004 -0.003 0.023
[0.004] [0.002] [0.013]*
Market Capitalization/GDP 0.005 -0.001 0.015
[0.003] [0.002] [0.012]
Inflation 0.023 0.071
[0.015] [0.129]
GDP Forecasts 0.116 0.102
[0.185] [0.822]
Trade 0.005
[0.014]
Informal Sector 0.015
[0.059]
# Observations 4519 4449 3758 5451 4423 3493 3833 4128 4314
R2 0.54 0.55 0.07 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.38
Table A1: Robustness -- Capital Mobility and Entrepreneurship 2004 (Cross Section)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction for heteroskedasticity and corrected at the country level
(clustering) except for entry regressions estimated by Tobit, which are not clustered. Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and
*10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable is
Entry in (1), (4), (6); log of employment in (2); and skewness of employment in (3), (5), (7)-(9). GDP data and Days to Start a Business are from WB, WDI,
Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption and Law and Order from ICRG. See the Data Appendix for a detailed description of the data.
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Dependent Variable Age Vintage
Domestic 
Entry Skewness Skewness Entry Skewness Skewness
OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS Tobit OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IMF Index 1.045 0.104 -9.617 -1.759 -3.910 -5.481
[0.496]** [0.709] [1.253]*** [0.605]*** [2.204]* [2.632]**
Log GDP 0.359 0.980 0.401 6.209 17.072 0.737 1.559 4.298
[0.094]*** [0.134]*** [0.171]** [0.249]*** [3.023]*** [0.113]*** [1.295] [0.836]***
Log GDP per capita -0.887 -1.170 -0.119 1.955 12.484 1.718 -0.928 -0.437
[0.182]*** [0.261]*** [0.749] [0.515]*** [16.344] [0.222]*** [0.878] [0.816]
GDP Growth -0.383 -0.456 -0.152 -1.080 -4.461 0.363 -0.805 -1.164
[0.053]*** [0.076]*** [0.194] [0.135]*** [2.613]* [0.065]*** [0.299]*** [0.241]***
Days to Start Business 0.000 0.023 0.007 -0.044 -0.304 -0.003 -0.057 -0.032
[0.004] [0.006]*** [0.010] [0.012]*** [0.252] [0.005] [0.026]** [0.022]
Bureaucratic Quality 0.572 1.922 -8.471 -3.621 -36.216 -1.174 -3.470 -1.349
[0.239]** [0.342]*** [0.673]*** [0.722]*** [9.434]*** [0.287]*** [1.105]*** [1.028]
Non-Corruption 0.194 0.944 2.524 3.872 11.683 0.265 0.013 3.182
[0.160] [0.228]*** [0.303]*** [0.478]*** [9.529] [0.191] [1.396] [0.659]***
Law and Order -0.418 -0.324 4.110 0.247 1.033 0.670 0.178 0.467
[0.121]*** [0.173]* [0.325]*** [0.333] [5.106] [0.145]*** [0.675] [0.579]
GDP Forecasts
Net Flows/GDP 0.146
[0.029]***
Equity Flows/GDP 2.972
[1.567]*
Firms 0.000 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]***
# Observations 5736 5736 3550 4240 4157 5736 4597 2390
R2 0.13 0.14 0.38 0.41 0.50 0.26
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction for heteroskedasticity and corrected at the country level (clustering), except for entry
regressions, which are estimated by Tobit and are not clustered. Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted by the
number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable is average age in (1); vintage in (2); domestic entry of new firms in (3), skweness o
employmnet in (4), (5), (7), (8); entry of new firms in (7). GDP data and Days to Start a Business come from WB, WDI, Bureaucratic Quality, Non-corruption, and Law and Order from
ICRG. See the Data Appendix for a detailed description of the data.
Table A2: Robustness -- Capital Mobility and Entrepreneurship 2004 (Cross Section)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship
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 Only Manufacturing Only Rich Countries Non-US Regional Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMF Index -5.161 -12.045 -8.046 -6.693
[1.726]*** [3.424]*** [2.940]*** [2.881]**
Log GDP 4.039 6.773 5.294 5.789
[0.645]*** [1.063]*** [0.704]*** [0.736]***
Log GDP per capita -0.804 1.146 -0.436 0.260
[0.522] [1.281] [0.931] [1.100]
GDP Growth -0.623 -1.405 -1.518 -1.298
[0.175]*** [0.317]*** [0.276]*** [0.271]***
Days to Start Business -0.036 -0.094 -0.046 -0.046
[0.018]** [0.029]*** [0.025]* [0.023]*
Bureaucratic Quality -0.615 -3.098 -2.074 -2.937
[0.712] [1.337]** [1.225]* [1.281]**
Non-Corruption 1.571 2.284 2.967 2.834
[0.467]*** [1.016]** [0.741]*** [0.818]***
Law and Order 0.228 0.189 0.775 -0.085
[0.413] [0.710] [0.625] [0.673]
Asia -1.435
[2.910]
Europe 1.892
[2.165]
Middle East North Africa -3.877
[2.196]*
South America -4.088
[2.219]*
North America 13.266
[15.419]
# Observations 1479 3894 4529 4596
R2 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction for heteroskedasticity and corrected at the
country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% significance. Regressions are weighted
by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure. The dependent variable corresponds to the skewness of
the employment distribution. The capital mobility variables correspond to the IMF index. Regression (1) is for the manufacturing sector only,
(2) is for industralized countries only, (3) excludes the United States from the sample, (4) includes regional dummies. See the Data Appendix
for a detailed description of the data.
Table A3: Robustness: Manufacturing, Rich Countries, Regional Dummies 
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Skewness of Employment (OLS/Weighted)
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Only Manufacturing Only Rich countries Non-US
(1) (2) (3)
D IMF Index 8.210 13.684 12.319
[3.583]** [5.115]** [5.105]**
D Log GDP -84.230 -146.338 -164.495
[36.147]** [52.955]*** [48.770]***
D Log GDP per capita 68.042 110.122 126.826
[33.052]** [48.696]** [45.035]***
D GDP Growth -0.876 -1.140 -1.156
[0.330]** [0.468]** [0.430]***
D Bureaucratic Quality 1.971 1.370 1.680
[1.330] [2.849] [2.658]
D Law and Order -1.715 -1.077 -0.605
[1.067] [1.529] [1.446]
D Non-Corruption 1.858 1.853 1.874
[1.060]* [1.419] [1.338]
Constant 4.918 21.340 11.694
[1.792]*** [1.118]*** [3.345]***
Observations 649 1919 1893
R2 0.20 0.29 0.31
Notes: All regressions include industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity and 
corrected at the country level (clustering). Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10%
significance. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms in each industry used to calculate the entrepreurship measure.
The dependent variable corresponds to the skewness of the employment distribution. Regression (1) is for the manufacturing
sector only, (2) only industralized countries, (3) the U.S. is excluded from the sample, (4) includes regional dummies. See
Data Appendix for detailed description of the data.
 Table A4: Robustness: Manufacturing, Rich Countries, Regional Dummies 
 – Differences in Differences 04-99 (OLS/Weighted)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship -- Skewness of Employment
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Dependent Variable Entry Skew. Entry Skew. Entry Skew. Entry Skew.
Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
New Firms in US x Inflows / GDP 0.006
[0.003]**
Skewness Firms in US x Inflows / GDP 0.001
[0.000]***
New Firms in US x FDI Flows / GDP 0.019
[0.011]*
Skewness Firms in US x FDI Flows / GDP 0.002
[0.001]**
New Firms in US x Gross Flows / GDP 0.006
[0.001]***
Skewness Firms in US x Gross Flows / GDP 0.003
[0.000]***
New Firms in US x Foreign Liabilities / GDP 0.065
[0.014]***
Skewness Firms in US x Foreign Liabilities / GDP 0.091
[0.009]***
# Observations 4737 4029 5728 4564 4852 3911 4054 2723
R2 0.26 0.38 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.40 0.26 0.47
Notes: All regressions include country and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%,
and *10% significance. In (1), (3), (5), (7) the dependent variable is entry of new firms; in (2), (4), (6), (8) the skewness of the employment distribution. See Data Appendix for detailed description of
the data.
Table B1: Entrepreneurship and Capital Mobility -- Benchmark - U.S. (Rajan and Zingales Methodology)
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurship 
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